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ABSTRACT
Rural community drinking water systems in New Mexico are facing many challenges,
including a lack of personnel, deteriorating infrastructure, lack of funds, overly burdensome
and confusing regulation, environmental concerns, and concerns over water rights.
Governing agencies are creating vulnerability by making managers prioritize some issues and
neglect others. Water systems designated a Mutual Domestic Water Consumers Associations
are especially problematic because they are small and managed by volunteers but have as
much regulatory burden as larger municipalities. I use the theory of institutional work to
explain how an institution that was originally designed to help low-income and rural
communities is now harming them. It is also a racially discriminatory institution as these
water systems are more often in majority Hispanic communities. Instead of state agencies
existing and serving community drinking water systems, the situation has flipped so that
drinking water systems appear to be serving the existence of governing agencies.
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Introduction
Like many water systems all across the United States, drinking water systems in New
Mexico, USA are facing numerous and serious challenges. The vast majority of residents in
the state rely on community drinking water systems, defined as “a system that serves at least
15 service connections used by year-round residences or regularly serve at least 25 yearround residents” (Public Water Systems Compliance Report 2017). Not having adequate
drinking water severely hampers resident’s ability to lead health and successful lives.
Because of this, it is important to understand the state of community drinking water systems
in New Mexico and examine their vulnerability and what challenges they face. Recent
literature has identified these challenges nationally, with the American Water Works
Association identifying renewal and replacement of aging water and wastewater
infrastructure, financing for capital improvements, and long-term water supply availability as
the top three issues that community water systems face (AWWA 2019; see also McFarlane &
Harris 2018). Allaire et al. (2018) spatially examine hotspots of violations to the Safe
Drinking Water Act and finds that the US Southwest has more violations than other regions
of the country. It has also been determined that due to limited resources and economies of
scale, small drinking water system typically have more difficulty in overcoming challenges
than larger systems (Mosheim & Ribaudo 2017). Because of these findings, New Mexico is
an ideal location to examine the challenges that water systems are facing and to what extent
these challenges are making rural water systems vulnerable. Because drinking water systems
are largely governed at the state level, it is also crucial to examine what role the institutional
and regulatory environments play.
In order to get a comprehensive understanding of the situation of drinking water governance
in New Mexico, I interview managers of rural drinking water system to learn about their
needs and concerns and what they are doing to manage them. I also get their perspective on
institutional dynamics, including their relationship with governing institutions. The
institutional structure of a water system, such as Mutual Domestic Water Consumers
Association (MDWCA), Cooperative, or Municipally Owned, has a substantial effect on how
managers are able to handle issues, and because of this, I further examine these institutional
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structures. Governing institutions, and their regulations and assistance, also have a large
impact on water systems, so I further analyze them to learn what role and impact they have.
This research takes an institutional approach, which means that institutions determine how a
system is governed, including how people interact with each other and with the resources
they are utilizing. Institutions are defined as rules and norms and determine who holds
decision making power (North 1991). For my research methodology, I use mixed methods
and grounded theory. Mixed methods combines and draws on the strengths of both
quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell 2014). Grounded theory allows me to enter the
situation with no theory and then create and test my theory as research progresses (Strauss &
Corbin 1994). My qualitative research consisted of 6 in-person interviews with water experts
and 30 in-person interviews with managers of rural drinking water systems from all across
the state. The purpose of these interviews was to learn the issues rural water systems are
facing from the people who are on the ground running them and what they are doing to
manage these issues. Qualitative research also consisted of examining state government
institutions and relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Quantitative research
consisted of comparing water system data to spatial and demographic data to see what
communities were associated with which institutional structure. This research did not
include water systems on tribal land due to the different institutional environment and
challenges in conducting research on tribal land.
This paper is broken into two chapters that examine the situation of rural community
drinking water systems in New Mexico from different angles. Chapter 1, titled “The creation
of vulnerability” focuses on the needs and concerns of rural drinking water system managers
and what they are doing to manage them. I then assess how these factors affect the
vulnerability of water systems. The primary research question for this chapter is,
•

What are the needs and concerns of rural drinking water system managers across New
Mexico and how do they contribute to the vulnerability of drinking water systems?

My research finds that rural drinking water systems in New Mexico face six main challenges,
which include not enough local people being engaged in running the water system, lack of
funds and difficulty receiving outside funding, deteriorating infrastructure, confusing and
burdensome regulation, environmental concerns, and having enough water rights or losing
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water rights. Some managers were also very concerned about regionalization of water
systems, but others thought it could help them. While some of these issues are more
tangible, such as aging infrastructure and environmental concerns, other problems are
“constructed,” including burdensome and confusing regulations and challenges in finding
funding. Many water systems, particularly MDWCAs, are managed by volunteers, and they
are tasked with a substantial about of work and responsibilities, and because of this they lack
experienced people who want to be involved with the water system. Because the people they
do have are spending so much time keeping up on regulations and navigating bureaucracy,
they are not planning for the longer-term issues of aging infrastructure and environmental
threats. Governing institutions have more power than water systems and they determined
certain issues were important, but water system managers argue that these issues are not as
big of issues as the issues that were created by the regulations. These “constructed”
problems are making rural water system more susceptible to perturbation because managers
are spending less time and effort addressing longer-term environmental and infrastructural
issues, and are therefore increasing their overall vulnerability. The regulations themselves
are not the issue, as managers largely do support the requirement for having clean and safe
water and they want to prevent financial fraud, but they have been created in a way that
makes it challenging for small and rural water systems to comply with.
Chapter 2 takes a more in-depth look into the various state and NGO governing institutions,
and the different institutional structures of water systems. The main research questions for
chapter 2 are,
•

What are the circumstances that have influenced why a community chose a specific
institutional structure for their drinking water system?

•

How does the institutional structure of a community drinking water system influence
its ability to meet its goals?

I determine that the institutional structure of a water system is influenced by the size and
household income of the community. I focus on the institutional structure of MDWCA,
because they are the most numerous and the interviews indicated that MDWCAs are
struggling more than water systems with other institutional structures. MDWCAs are among
the smallest water systems but have as much regulatory burden as larger municipally owned
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systems. Because they are a subdivision of the state government, they are eligible for more
public funds. However, the median monthly water rate for MDWCAs is among the highest,
so the increased regulatory burden for increased funding eligibility does not appear to be a
good tradeoff. MDWCAs are also in the lowest income and predominantly Hispanic
communities.
The institutional structure of MDWCA was created in 1947 to give more state resources to
low-income rural communities to improve their drinking water systems and promote public
health (Clark 1987). It was widely seen as a successful measure, but in the many years since
its creation, it has become a negative and racially discriminatory institution. To argue how
this happened, I use the theoretical lens of institutional work, which is defined as purposive
actions that create, maintain or disrupt institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby 2006). The
institution of MDWCA has remained statutorily relatively constant, but tangential
institutional changes through increased regulation and oversight placed upon MDWCAs have
drastically altered it as an institution. Because so much reinforcing institutional work has
also been placed upon it by actions such as increasing the number of MDWCA systems,
hiring regulatory staff, and conducting trainings for MDWCA managers, the institution of
MDWCA is very strong. Because it remains strong, it would take a great deal of disrupting
institutional work to significantly alter it. Governing agencies are aware of many of the
issues with MDWCAs but there are no good alternative institutional structures if
communities still want to be eligible for state funds. In this situation, institutional work has
been explicitly political and has acted on MDWCAs by tangential regulatory legislation.
This institutional work has shifted power away from rural communities and their drinking
water systems and toward the state government.
The two chapters in this paper are written to be read independently. Because of this, there is
significant overlap in content. The two chapters take different paths, use different theoretical
lenses, and have unique findings, but they both come to the same overarching conclusion.
State governing agencies no longer are existing and serving community drinking water
systems. Instead, this situation has flipped, and water systems seem to be existing and
serving governing state agencies. The reason is because, as chapter 1 explains, governing
agencies are causing systems to become vulnerable and as chapter 2 explains, institutional
work has shifted power away from communities and toward the state government.
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Chapter 1
The creation of vulnerability
Chapter 1 Introduction
New Mexico, USA is a largely rural state with most of the population outside the larger
towns along the Rio Grande relying on small community drinking water systems for delivery
of potable water to their homes. These community drinking water systems vary greatly and
include differences in type of water source, source water chemistry, number of connections,
age of the water system, the institutional structure of the water system, and who is running it.
Because of all these variables, different water systems face many different challenges, but
overall, literature shows small water systems tend to have more difficultly overcoming these
challenges than large urban water systems (Mosheim & Ribaudo 2017).
There is a growing literature documenting the issues that water systems are facing and where
water systems that appear most vulnerable are located (see McFarlane & Harris 2018;
Stanford 2008; Kline 2017; Allaire 2018). However, these studies focus on either large
datasets, legislation and institutions, small case studies, or trends in literature. There is a lack
of on the ground research to see what challenges the people running these small water
systems are facing and what they are doing to meet these challenges. This is especially
important in New Mexico because as Allaire et al. (2018) found, water systems in the US
Southwest have more Safe Drinking Water Act violations and appear to be more vulnerable
than the rest of the country. They also found there are more violations in rural areas than
urban areas.
Because of this research gap, I found a need to learn from the people who are tasked with
running rural water systems in New Mexico, as they can give insight into what issues they
are facing and what they are doing to handle them. What are the needs and concerns of rural
drinking water system managers across New Mexico and how do they contribute to the
vulnerability of drinking water systems?
I find that rural drinking water systems in New Mexico are facing numerous issues including
not having enough local people engaged in running the water system, deteriorating
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infrastructure, lack of funds and difficulty receiving outside funding, confusing and
burdensome regulation, environmental concerns, including drought, wildfire, and
contamination, and concerns of having enough water rights or losing their water rights.
Regionalization was also a concern for many system managers, but others saw it as a solution
to many of their challenges. I found all these issues not to be separate, and that they had
large influences on each other. Institutions were important factors, including state
government institutions and the individual institutional structures of water systems.
Navigating bureaucracy was a huge challenge for most small water systems. Regulating and
funding institutions that are supposed to promote safe and affordable drinking water for
consumers are making rural water systems more vulnerable. Instead of government agencies
serving and promoting the existence rural drinking water systems, the situation has flipped so
that water systems seem to be serving and providing for the existence of governing
institutions.
Managers are tasked with so many “constructed” problems that also tend to be “today
problems,” such as keeping up to date on regulations, that they are not putting as much
thought and effort into the longer-term issues of aging infrastructure and environmental
concerns. If vulnerability is defined as the exposure and sensitivity to perturbation and the
system’s ability to adapt (Adger 2006), then this situation is increasing water system’s
sensitivity and exposure to perturbations, and because they lack having enough experienced
people running their systems, they have low adaptive capacity when faced with serious and
abrupt challenges. Regulating institutions have more power than water systems and they
decided that water quality and financial fraud were significant issues that needed addressing.
However, managers argue that the way these issues are being addressed is creating even
bigger issues for them: the people who are actually managing and operating rural community
drinking water systems.
There was also the general sentiment among water system managers and other officials that
drinking water systems in New Mexico are starting to fail. However, water systems may be
failing in terms of satisfying regulations, but they do not seem to be failing in delivering
water to their community. Rural water systems may be very vulnerable if the required
outcome is delivery of water and satisfying all regulatory requirements, but if the desired
outcome is only the delivery of water then systems are not as vulnerable.
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Community Drinking Water Systems in New Mexico
New Mexico has 570 community drinking water systems, with the vast majority of them
serving small communities. In New Mexico, a community drinking water system is defined
as “a system that serves at least 15 service connections used by year-round residences or
regularly serve at least 25 year-round residents” (Public Water Systems Compliance Report
2017). In 2018, approximately 269,000 people in New Mexico, accounting for 14 percent of
the population, received their drinking water from a community water system serving
populations less than 5,000 people, and 444,000 people, or 24 percent of the population, from
a system serving less than 10,000 people (Community Systems Water Quality 2018). All
community drinking water systems are subject to EPA regulation and quality standards. In
New Mexico, drinking water systems are regulated by the New Mexico Environment
Department (NMED) Drinking Water Bureau, which is a state entity tasked with enforcing
regulation passed by the federal Safe Drinking Water Act (1974, 1986, 1996).
Drinking water systems on tribal land were not included in this study for multiple reasons.
Tribal water systems are not governed by NMED and have a much different institutional and
regulatory environment. There are also added barriers in conducting this type of research on
tribal land. Permission must be granted by each Reservation or Pueblo. Because of the
added research challenges and different institutional environment, drinking water governance
on tribal land is beyond the scope of this research.
Non-tribal water systems in New Mexico consist of a variety of institutional structures, with
the most prominent ones being Mutual Domestic Water Consumers Associations
(MDWCAs), Water and Sanitation Districts (WSDs), Cooperatives, Non-profits, Investor
Owned, and Municipally Owned. The institutional structure of a water system is important
because it largely determines the regulatory requirements of the system and what financial
resources are available. As will be shown, these regulatory requirements are causing
substantial challenges to small water systems and because different institutional structures
serve different communities, the regulations are also having different impacts on different
communities. MDWCAs are the most numerous institutional structure and account for 37
percent of total community drinking water systems in the state. Along with WSDs, they are
technically subdivisions of the state government. MDWCAs, WSDs, and municipally owned
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systems are considered public entities and are subjected to more financial regulation than the
other institutional structures, which are considered private. Municipally owned systems and
WSDs serve larger communities than the other institutional structures, and on average
MDWCAs serve communities with the lowest household income and communities with
predominantly Hispanic populations.
New Mexico rural water systems also face numerous environmental issues. As with other
areas around the globe, average annual temperatures across New Mexico are increasing and
expected to continue to do so (Lehner et al. 2018). The US Environmental Protection
Agency predicts that wildfires will become more frequent and severe in the coming years due
to increased temperature and large fuel loads from decades of fire suppression (EPA 2016).
More uncertain however is how greenhouse gasses will affect moisture, because the US
Southwest is already an area with highly variable precipitation patterns (Lehner et al. 2018).
Nevertheless, large and hot wildfires dramatically alter the hydrology of streams and
watersheds that communities rely on by contaminating the water with soot and heavy metals,
creating conditions for flash floods, preventing aquifer recharge, and destroying water intake
and treatment infrastructure (U.S. Global Change Research Program 2018). Because of all
these factors, it is important to understand how rural water systems in New Mexico are
handling these issues and what role institutions play.

Vulnerability of Social-Ecological Systems
Drinking water systems can be considered social-ecological systems. A social-ecological
system refers to the interactions between users and resources in a common-pool resource
system (Ostrom 2007). It can include governance of resource use, maintenance of the
resource, and the broader ecological and political-economic systems (McGinnis and Ostrom
2014). For social-ecological systems, stresses that contribute to vulnerability can be
anthropogenic or naturally occurring. Examples of stresses include drought, flood, extreme
weather events, wildfire, biologic infestations, economic or societal change, war, disease, or
other political-economic factors.
For a social-ecological system, vulnerability is the exposure and sensitivity to perturbation
and the system’s ability to adapt (Adger 2006). Exposure can be thought of as the
magnitude, amount, and duration of stresses and sensitivity is how much the social-
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ecological system is affected by those stresses. Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to
evolve to accommodate these new stresses (Adger 2006).
A vulnerable system is one that is susceptible to threats, does not have the necessary
resilience to withstand those threats, and does not have sufficient capacity to adapt (Elias et
al. 2018). Although vulnerability can be thought of as an equation of exposure, sensitivity,
and adaptive capacity it also incorporates broader social topics including power,
marginalization, and social structure because these all have a large impact on why a system is
vulnerable or who is negatively affected (Smit and Wandel 2006). A thorough understanding
of a social-ecological system incorporates politics, economics, and sociology, and because of
this it is more useful to discuss contextual vulnerability with a human security framing as
opposed to outcome vulnerability with a scientific and technical framing (O’Brian et al.
2007). Technical fixes can help decrease vulnerability, but in order to better understand a
social-ecological system, an approach should be taken that incorporates aspects of political
ecology (Taylor 2013). A society, an ecosystem, or a social-ecological system does not
become vulnerable in a vacuum; there are political, economic, and societal forces at play that
are causing that system to become vulnerable, and sometimes by making one socialecological system less vulnerable another one becomes more vulnerable (Mosse 2007).
For community drinking water systems in New Mexico, stresses can include environmental
factors such as wildfire, drought, flood, and contamination, but can also include overly
burdensome regulation, lack of funding, and failing infrastructure. As I will show, the ability
of a water system to address these stresses is highly dependent on its institutional structure
and how they interact with governing institutions. I look to see what these stressors are, how
people are managing them, who they are affecting, and what it means for rural water systems
as a social-ecological system.

Methodology
For my research, I use grounded theory and mixed methods. Grounded theory is defined as,
“a general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically
gathered and analyzed. Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through
continuous interplay between analysis and data collection” (Strauss & Corbin 1994). To
learn from them what their needs and concerns are, I interviewed 30 managers of rural

10

drinking water systems across New Mexico. I entered this situation without having a theory
of what their situation was. After a number of interviews, I created a theory and then used
subsequent interviews to test this theory.
Mixed method research is defined as “an approach to research in the social, behavioral, and
health sciences in which the investigator gathers both quantitative (close-ended) and
qualitative (open-ended) data, integrates the two and then draws interpretations based on the
combined strengths of both sets of data to understand research problems” (Creswell 2014, p.
2). In my research, the qualitative data included the interviews with water managers and also
an examination of material published by governing institutions in order to understand their
role in water system governance. Quantitative research consisted of an analysis of water
system data and demographic data with the goal of testing and further expanding on the
theory created during the interview process. Both the qualitative and quantitative data
constantly informed the direction of each other.
The interview process consisted of six in-person interviews with water experts from various
governing entities and 30 in-person interviews with drinking water system managers across
all regions of New Mexico. The 570 community drinking water systems in New Mexico
were randomized and those serving more than 5,000 people were eliminated, as less than
5,000 residents is the definition of a small system used by New Mexico Rural Water
Association. From the top of the randomized list, our research team emailed and called the
administrative contacts for the water systems and then scheduled in-person interviews. In
order to get 30 managers to agree to an in-person interview, we went through approximately
one-third of the 570 community drinking water systems. This biased our sample to select for
managers who were more willing to put time into their water system and were willing to
discuss their system with university researchers. Because of this, it is likely that the systems
that we visited are doing better than the average rural water system in the state. The
administrative contact for different water systems held different positions. The
administrative contact was most often the president of the water association board or the
public works person in a municipal government. Occasionally, the administrative contact
was the water system operator or the accountant, and they usually referred us to someone
who was more involved with the system’s day-to-day operations. The goal was to interview
whoever was most familiar with the system and responsible for meeting state regulations. In
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this paper, I simply refer to this person and the “manager,” but they may hold different
positions. On occasion, our interviews included many people involved with the water
system, such as the board president, other board members, operators, or accountants.
The interviews were transcribed and then coded into themes using the qualitative research
software NVivo 12. Themes included topics such as concerns that the interviewee may have,
their interactions with different governing agencies, and their opinion on regionalization.
Coding the interviews into themes allowed me to see, for example, how many interviewees
discussed finances as an issue. It helped me easily compare different answers to the same
question, such as “If you had a magic wand, what would you change about how the system is
managed?” This tool also allowed me to draw connections from certain issues to other
variables, such as the institutional structure of that water system.
The interview findings informed me which governing institutions warranted further research.
I examined documents and other material published by state regulatory agencies and NGOs
to better understand their role and also to compare the perspectives of the interviewed
managers to how the agencies viewed themselves.
The interviews also told me what spatial data were likely to be relevant. Community
drinking water system data was obtained from the Drinking Water Watch database through
the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED)
(https://dww.water.net.env.nm.gov/NMDWW/). To get the data in a more usable format, we
submitted a public records request. The institutional structure of water systems was found
through the New Mexico Secretary of State’s website
(https://portal.sos.state.nm.us/BFS/online/CorporationBusinessSearch). Data for drinking
water rates was obtained from the NMED website
(https://www.env.nm.gov/drinking_water/rates/). Demographic data was obtained from the
US Census American Community Survey 5-year average from 2012 to 2017. Supplemental
mapping data was acquired from New Mexico Resource Geographic Information
(https://rgis.unm.edu/). All spatial data was analyzed using ArcMap GIS 10.6.
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Results
The interview questions were organized into four main sections, which include general
information about the water system, how the water system is managed, their needs and
concerns, and possible solutions. The interviews were semi-structured, with the goal of
letting the interviewee describe their situations without being influenced by our thoughts or
what they thought we wanted to hear. The water system managers we interviewed managed
a wide range of water systems, including variation in how big their system was, how old it
was, and where they get their source water from. They were also managed in different ways,
such as being organized as different institutional structures and what role different people
have in running the system. For their needs and concerns, the interviews revealed six main
themes:
•

Lack of personnel and engaged citizens

•

Deteriorating infrastructure

•

Lack of funds and difficulty receiving outside funding

•

Overly burdensome and confusing regulation

•

Environmental concerns, including drought, wildfire, and contamination

•

Concerns of having enough water rights or losing water rights

For solutions to these concerns, managers had different opinions on what would help them,
and all of them had an opinion on regionalization and if it would help them or if it was an
additional concern.

Personnel and engaged citizens
One of the issues that came up most often during our interviews was that water system
managers were struggling to get residents involved in managing and operating their system.
This was generally the case for MDWCAs and other institutional structures with a volunteer
board. There are many reasons for residents not wanting to be on the board, including the
amount of effort required, not getting paid, taking on the responsibility, not having
knowledge of water systems, and having to interact with upset water users. Small
communities also simply had a small pool of people available to manage their water system.
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Board members are all volunteer, so people must take on the responsibility with no financial
compensation. Because it is volunteer, people either manage a water system on top of
another job or they are retired. There were a substantial number of interviewees who were
happy managing their water systems, but many expressed that they did not want to do it and
were just managing it because they thought no one else would. As one interviewee stated,
-

Imagine you living, having to provide for your family, just living, and then going and
having to do research about water, and how you get water, and what is this, and what
is that, and how to do this, and how to do that. I mean, imagine that. That's total
burnout. You're totally done by the time... after a year. Or people think, "Oh, cool. I'm
going to be a board member. I'm going to tell people. I'm going to make sure things
are done right, and we're going to do this, and we're going to do that." Then reality
hits and you're like, "Screw this. I don't even make a dollar for all this stress, all this
pressure." It's weighing on individuals.

Another manager expressed a similar concern regarding state regulations and said,
-

Yeah and imagine if you're a board member and you have a full-time job and you're
trying to get these questions answered, it's just not going to happen. So, navigating
through all of that, that's the key. Navigating, if you can navigate and you're persistent
you can, you can find your way. But the average volunteer, it’s asking a lot.

Many of the managers interviewed were even quite bitter that they were the ones stuck with
running the system. As described by one manager,
-

We redid our bylaws and went to a five-member board. At that point I was the one
stupid enough in the room to stick my hand up and say, "Sure, I'll be president." I've
offered to resign at every annual meeting, and nobody will let me.

Another manager said,
-

And no good deed goes unpunished, my friend. Let me tell you. In this type of
business, it does not. It's difficult to deal with that because sometimes, you just want
to say, "Well, everybody go to hell. I'm doing this for free," because you gain
nothing, but making sure your water turns on, your toilet flushes, and that your trash
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is thrown beyond that. It's quality of life. And so, other than that, you get nothing, but
you get all the responsibility.
When asked if they think there is this particular type of person in rural New Mexico who
becomes a drinking water system manager, some responded with, “No, nobody wants to do
it” and “Those dumb enough to stick up their hand and volunteer. All the rural systems are all
volunteer jobs, so it's people that are just caring enough that are willing to spend some time
doing it.”
Most water systems are required to have elections for board members, but many expressed
that they didn’t have enough people to run. A couple managers stated that they unknowingly
got elected to the board and said that if you don’t want to be officially on the board, you
better start showing up to the meeting and get involved voluntarily. Other managers stated,
“[we] had elections, and nobody showed up. Nobody registered and then nobody showed up
to run or to vote because there's nobody to vote for.” “It was a sham because nobody was
running and nobody voted, but whatever, we met the requirement.” People are thinking of
creative ways to incentivize people to come to their meetings. Sometimes this is to try to get
people to come so they can persuade them to become board members, but often, systems just
need to have a quorum of water system members to vote on issues like changes to water rates
or by-laws. People bring baked goods, offer water bill discounts to people who come, and
one manager even signaled they were going to raise rates, just so people would show up to
complain, even though they were not actually planning on raise rates.
The reasons why residents were not involved in managing the water systems varied by
community. Many small towns in New Mexico that are in scenic locations or close to
recreation sites have seasonal residents. They had a hard time finding engaged people who
were around all year. Other small communities have a problem with young residents moving
away to larger towns or they complain the young people that are there are too busy.
Many of the people managing and operating water systems are older. There were three main
reasons for this. One is that for some people, the water system is their baby and they don’t
want to let other people run it, so they run it for decades. Second, people who have time to
run water systems are generally retired. Third, people are put in a management position and
feel like they can’t leave because no one else will take it over. Many people joked about how
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they are going to be doing it until they die. When asked how long they see themselves
running the water system, one manager said, “Probably until I die. Because nobody else
wants it.” Another manager said, “Essentially it’s a lifetime position because nobody else
wants it. Truth is, we don’t want it either.”
There is also a lack of certified operators in rural areas and many of the ones that do exist are
elderly. A manager described this situation by saying,
-

Finding a good quality operator is extremely difficult. The guy we have is great, but
he’s pretty long in the tooth. He's almost 80 years old. Does he want to be climbing
around, digging around out in the rain? No. Where do we find a new one?

Another manager said, “So, when we had those leaks, we had 70 and 80-year-old men out
there digging ditches in the middle of winter, middle of summer, whatever.”
Finding an operator is difficult and often times they live in distant towns. Some managers
described situations where they would essentially do everything and then the certified
operator would come and do something like tighten the last bolt.
Many managers complained that by being a board member you also have to deal with upset
residents and neighbors. Broken water mains are a big issue and when that happens, many
people don’t have water in their homes and are upset with the manager until it gets fixed.
Residents also get upset when water rates are raised. Many systems have problems with
people not paying their water bill. When this happens, managers are faced with deciding
whether to just let it go or to turn water off to someone’s house. Many of these places are
tight-knit communities, so you may end up turning water off for to your neighbor or family
member, or you turn off water to someone else’s family member and then they get upset with
you. As one manager described, if you decide not to turn off water, you have no way to force
people to pay their water bills. They said,
-

People are getting free water because water boards are afraid to go and shut off water.
There's no system to shut off and warn people that hey, if you don't pay. Can you
imagine living in a small community with three or four hundred people and you shut
off your uncle's water or here you know your grandmother's water. And so you're
dealing with that and that's a problem.

16

To state how this is affecting board member retention, one manager said, “The water board
members get burnt out, and then there's no one else who wants to serve on the board because
they've been abused for so long.”

Infrastructure
Along with water systems all over the US, most water systems in New Mexico have been
around for a long time and some of their infrastructure is starting to fail. The biggest
infrastructure issue for rural water systems in New Mexico is leaky pipes and water main
breaks. Most pipes have been in the ground for many years and are starting to deteriorate.
This results in more water main breaks where people are without water and managers and
operators have to go find and fix the break, but perhaps more importantly leaky pipes result
in water loss from the system. Not only is this wasteful, it drastically increases the water use
of the system, the cost of pumping water, and the wear and tear on equipment, especially
pumps. Some interviewed manager’s systems were losing around half of their water they
were producing out of their leaking pipes. Another manager said that for their three well
systems, one well was essentially dedicated to adding the amount of water to the system that
they were losing. Deteriorating pipes were the main infrastructure concern for managers, but
they also were facing aging wells, pumps, storage tanks, meters, and computer systems.

Funding
Deteriorating infrastructure would likely not be as big of an issue for water systems if they
were able to receive sufficient infrastructure funding. However, there are many different
funding streams available to water systems. According the Environmental Finance Center
Network (2019) there are 34 different funding streams available, although different sources
are only available to certain systems based on the size of the system and the institutional
structure. It does not appear that there is a lack of dollars meant to go to water systems;
instead it seems that managers don’t know how to access them or there are too many hurdles
to jump to get them.
The issue of not knowing what funds are available is an issue for many reasons; one of which
is that there are so many other tasks, such as complying with regulations or working a fulltime job. This makes it so people don’t have the time to devote to investigating all the
different funding mechanisms available for their institutional structure or population.
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Another reason is that institutional structures are opaque. Usually, everyone is on the same
page, but occasionally the manager thinks they are one structure, the state thinks there are
another one, and their article of incorporation may be another. Additionally, different people
call the same institutional structure different names, or they say they are an institutional
structure that does not technically exist.
Even if managers do know what funds to apply for, there are barriers in getting them. First,
water systems that are subdivisions of the state government, such as MDWCAs and WSDs,
are required to be up to date with their financial audits if they want to receive any state funds.
They are required to be audited regardless of requesting funding, but from talking to
managers, it appears that withholding funding is a way for the state to enforce that
requirement. It is understandable that the state wants water systems that receive state funds
to financially responsible, but it is an additional barrier and cost for them.
For water systems to receive some sources of infrastructure funding, they must first have a
preliminary engineering report. One manager described the government being an obstacle in
them getting a grant by saying,
-

In a way it is an issue because they're getting in the way. When the government gets
in the way it's a problem. To be able to replace that well, we have to get an
engineering assessment. We have to get it assessed by an engineer. That's going to
cost about $30,000 to do what I already know we need to be done. It's a needless cost
on a small water system. If you want a grant you have to get an engineering
assessment on your entire system. That's probably about $50,000, if you want a grant.
If I want a grant and you're making me pay $50,000 just to apply to get a grant there's
no guarantees. Why should I do that?

Another manager said, “So now, not only do you have the cost of refurbishing it, now, you
have the cost of an engineer... Or even legal fees they require... Nothing's easy.”
One system we visited had so many problems with water quality regulations that they just
assumed they were in violation and constantly told customers that they were under a boil
water notice. They would receive priority funding if residents are in danger of acute and
serious health violations, but apparently their violations are not serious enough. They
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couldn’t afford the treatment to get them out of violation, so they felt they were stuck. They
claimed that there were many systems in this same situation.
Because many water systems are deteriorating and funding is difficult to obtain, many
systems are patching their water systems with “infrastructure bandages.” Many systems need
to replace all of their piping, but they don’t have the funds to do it, so they keep patching
pipes and putting small fixes on things. As one manager described, making old infrastructure
work can cost more money and said,
-

I'll tell you, we had a booster pump go down. One of my colleagues takes [it] in,
they're taking [it] in [on] their own dime, you know, gas, and you know, all the way
to Albuquerque. Or when I'm doing stuff, I'm doing it on my own. It's costing money.

Another manager described the extra effort that it takes when systems aren’t working
properly by saying,
-

We were having problems with our pumps and our pump house, actually, the
electrical breaker. Literally, I had to be there at night, waking up two, three times at
night to go and turn on the pumps manually so that in the morning when every single
individual gets up and takes a shower to go to work, there would be water, and that is
the responsibility of a board member. It's tough. It's really, really tough.

Regulations
Another issue that came up frequently during the interviews was that regulations were too
difficult to comply with. The number of state government regulatory requirements varies by
system institutional structure, number of connections, and revenue, but there is a minimum of
seven and a maximum of eleven reporting requirements (New Mexico Environment
Department, Tools & Resources for Public Water Systems). These include water quality
monitoring, Consumer Confidence Reports, water use, taxation, water conservation, Open
Meetings Act, financial audit reporting, annual budget reporting, quarterly budget reporting,
corporate entity reporting, and underground utility reporting. All these reports are
administered by eight different state agencies and are due with different frequencies during
different times of the year.
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On top of these regulations, water systems have their own regulations dictated by their
system by-laws. What these are depends on the institutional structure of the water system,
but for MDWCAs, they must have regular meetings, have a quorum to make decisions, have
multiple and an odd number of board members, and hold board elections in November,
which was a new regulation that most managers did not appear to know. Additionally, all
community drinking water systems are required to have a certified operator. There are
different levels of certification based on the number of system connections, but operators
must take an exam to initially be certified and then must keep up on continuing education
credits from workshops or other trainings.
Meeting all of these requirements seems to be much more of a challenge for smaller water
systems that larger ones because they are managed by volunteers and the smaller a
community is, the smaller the pool of people who may be willing to put in the time and effort
in satisfying these requirements. People in small communities clearly described this situation
by saying,
-

We need the State people to consider this smaller rural community as far as we still
need to follow the regulations in order to provide safe water to our customers. But
some of the things that they are requiring small systems to fulfill, they have us at the
same level as the big municipalities. And it creates a hardship for us because we don't
have the income. And most importantly, we don't have the people. We just don't have
the people.

-

Back in the day it was pretty lax. So we're just trying to keep up with all the
regulations and stay in good standing with everything so we can continue moving
forward. It's almost a full-time job.

Keeping up with the regulations and paperwork requires a different skillset than general dayto-day operations of a water system. It requires that people have a level of understanding of
how government and reporting works. Many of the managers we interviewed were people
who had a background in related fields and expressed that they didn’t understand how other
water systems could stay up on it, including one that said,
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-

You get a small board of normal Joe people. I don't know how they do it. I don't
know how they keep track of the regulations and what they can do, and what they
can't do. I honestly don't know how they do it. I can't imagine they're in compliance.

Many managers complained that regulations were placed upon them, but they aren’t given
the resources to meet them. This may be through what some called “unfunded mandates,”
which are regulations the state and federal governments create, but do not give water systems
money to comply with them. Others complained that the state will not tell them what they
need to do to fix their situation and get in compliance. A manager described their
relationship with state regulators and said,
-

To talk to us about what we're doing wrong. I would love to hear less about what I'm
doing wrong and how I can solve the problem. Because that seems to be what the
state is really good at, is, "You're doing this wrong." "Well, how can I solve it?" "Oh,
I'm not allowed to tell you that. I can't give you ideas on how to fix it because if I tell
you one thing, it sounds like I'm favoring something." And it's like, really just
between us, you can tell me. I'm not going to tell them. I just want to fix this so that
you're not out here all the time, and I'm not hearing from you every two, three
months.

In general, offering assistance is not the role of state government agencies, but the state
government is the main entity that water systems interact with, so managers are often times
looking to them for assistance. Water system managers want to be in compliance and
provide safe drinking water, but many don’t have the ability to do it, and the state is not
helping them get there. Another manager said,
-

Just, you know, whether filing paperwork or certain things and it's like you can give
me a paper and what good if I don't understand it. I'm asking you for help. And then, I
don't know, I just had two board members tell me they've been on there... We've all
been on here about... Oh maybe just over half a year. And somebody said, "Oh, I can't
wait until January. I'm not dealing with this anymore."

With so many regulations and requirements to keep up on, many managers don’t even know
what they are missing. When asked if they were having difficulty with regulations, one
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manager said, “Not particularly. I mean, we're complying with every rule that we know of.
I'm sure there's a bunch we don't know about, but no, that's not the issue.”
One of the biggest themes that managers spoke of when it comes to regulation is that running
a water system used to be about providing the actual water, but now it has turned more into a
desk job because of all the paperwork. One water manager said, “I used to be about 70%
outside, now I'm about 80% inside. So I'm doing a lot of paperwork and that's not really what
I like to do, I like to be outside.” Many managers expressed that providing water to residents
wasn’t the challenge in managing a system, it was staying up to date and compliant on all the
regulations.
In general, water system managers were not arguing that there should not be regulations, they
would just like them to be easier to comply with. One interviewee stated,
-

And in addition to having to report and provide all the documents and meet all the
other requirements, EPA requirements, and they should happen. I mean you should
test your water, you should make sure it's safe. You should be accountable for the
revenue that comes in and goes out and answer to the state, for that you should. You
should have oversight.

Rural communities want water that is as high of quality and regulated just like larger towns,
they just don’t have the resources that larger towns have to comply with all the testing.

Environmental concerns
Before starting this research, I believed that one of the biggest issues that managers were
facing were environmental concerns, such as drought, fire, and floods. This turned out to not
be the case, not because these are not issues, but because they seem to be faced with so many
other tasks that they are not thinking about these issues. Water systems have so many “today
problems” that they are not thinking as much about environmental concerns, because those
tend to be “tomorrow problems.” Unfortunately, natural disasters can strike abruptly, and
then environmental issues are no longer “tomorrow problems.”
Many managers said that they were not concerned about wildfire because they believed that
there was not enough vegetation around them to burn. At times this claim surprised us, but it
would take another study to determine an objective fire risk compared to what water
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managers’ perceptions of fire risk was. System managers who have had wildfire impact their
source water were among the only ones who said it was a major concern. However, when
asked if they would have said it was a risk before the fire occurred, they said they probably
would have said they were not concerned about fire. When wildfire was mentioned, many
more managers brought up the concern of having enough water in their systems to fight fires.
They discussed not having enough pressure, and many talked about how the diameter of their
water pipes didn’t allow them to have fire hydrants.
Only a couple systems claimed that flooding was a risk for their water system, but
surprisingly, quite a few systems cited lightning as an environmental issue. Lightning would
strike their tank or wellhouse and destroy the electronics. This would make the tanks not
realize they were low, or make the well pump not run.
The majority of the managers interviewed said that drought was a concern, but they had very
different perceptions about why it was an issue. Many dismissed it because they believed
New Mexico is a dry state and therefore it is always in a drought. Others had concerns with
how decreased rain and snow would affect their source water. Many managers were more
concerned about drought because of what it meant from a community relations standpoint.
As discussed earlier, maintaining a good relationship with water consumers can always be a
challenge. When there is a drought, this relationship becomes much more tense. One
interviewee described this situation by saying,
-

That's always a concern because it increases the demand for water and people tend to
steal water from their neighbors, from fire hydrants. And from a customer service
perspective they might accidentally leave their water hose on and say they didn't and
things like that, and that we might be lying about their meter readings. So, when you
see high drought and people using more water, then they're having to pay more for it
because they use more, they really take it out on the customer service people. “I didn't
use that much, you're lying, I sent my money you must have spent it.” People can get
very very angry and threatened to kill you. Things like that can be really bad for you.
Oh yeah. Oh yeah. Really nasty. And call over and over and over and over again.
Harass you, so I hate drought. I hate it for that reason because it really sets people on
edge. And it's a trickledown effect. Yeah. And so you lose a lot of people. A lot of
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people who used to do this in their communities say no more because you can't even
go to the store because you're being harassed.
A few managers who ran systems with shallow wells were concerned with contamination
from septic tanks, although they never brought this up as a main concern. A few managers
brought up issues of water quality in regard to levels of arsenic, uranium, manganese, and
iron. Some complained how expensive it was to treat, but others talked about how people
have been drinking that water for their whole life and wonder why it is unsafe now. One
interviewee said,
-

Like I said, I've drunk this water all my life and I'm still healthy. I'm 78 years old. It's
not hurting me because the amounts are so minute. When you fail, it's just like I said,
a 0.01 and they'll make you fail parts per million. We don't have any babies that are
sick or nothing that we know.

Source water protection plans are currently being promoted by the state government and
NGOs. They are not required by any regulation, but they are supposed to help communities
identify and mitigate possible sources of contamination. Even though they are being
promoted, most interviewees did not know what they were. A couple had them and were
very dedicated to following them, but others confused them with other programs, such as
sanitary surveys. Overall, environmental concerns seem to be more of a topic of concern for
state officials and NGOs than the people who are managing the water systems.

Water rights
Water rights are a hot topic in New Mexico and all across the western US. Water rights were
a concern for most water systems, but they were rarely a top issue. The one interviewee who
did list water rights as a top concern said, “That has always been my concern, losing our
water rights to somebody else. That's one of my big concerns…We're very lucky we have
good water, good and safe drinking water, and we are the envy of the State probably.” Many
rural communities are very old, and some towns used to have higher populations, so they
have plenty of water rights that are quite senior in the prior appropriation system. Newer
communities or subdivisions generally did not have as many, or as senior, water rights and
for them it was more of a concern.
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One interesting aspect of water rights for drinking water systems is the idea of beneficial use.
This is the idea that in order to keep your right to use water, you must use it for something
beneficial. Communities that have more water rights than they use do not want to lose them,
so they sometimes promote things like gardens so people will use more water. However, this
is a catch-22 because they also want to conserve water, so they do not deplete their aquifer,
or wherever they are getting their water from. There is not a direct relation of water
availability and water rights, so in order to prove more beneficial use, some communities are
choosing to use more water rather than conserve it. Increased water use has other negative
effects, including increased wear and tear on pumps and other equipment.
All community water systems are supposed to have a 40-year water development plan for the
Office of the State Engineer. Some communities are trying to argue that they might grow
and add connections to their water system, so they need to keep all their water rights. Many
communities think that the state was looking to take their water rights in order to meet New
Mexico’s water delivery obligations to Texas. The topic of water rights came up often in the
context of regionalization.

Discussion
As discussed, drinking water system managers are facing many challenges and have differing
opinions on what the solutions to these challenges are. The issues they face may seem
separate, but they are related to each other in many ways. The most explicit example of this
is that communities are struggling to get people to run their water systems because there are
so many challenges that they face. The managers are faced with complying with confusing
and burdensome regulations involving environmental and water quality issues as well as
financial reports and audits. They also are the ones who deal with maintaining old
infrastructure or trying to receive finding to replace infrastructure. They are also concerned
about their water rights. It appears that because managers have to navigate so many
challenges, they are hardly thinking about environmental threats. This only seems to change
when there is an emergency and a fire decimates a watershed, a flood takes out a well or
pipes, or a well runs dry during a drought. These are concerns that the state and NGOs are
thinking about, but most managers of small rural water systems do not have the time or
resources to be proactive with these threats. However, many water systems in New Mexico
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have not been fortunate in having environmental concerns continue to be “tomorrow
problems.”
The water systems that this situation seems to be the most problematic for are MDWCAs.
They are among the smallest water systems, so they have the smallest pool to draw managers
from, they have among the least amount of money because of the small amount of rate
payers, and they are managed by volunteers. Some systems are managed very well, and
people described them as “gems,” but for many others, this is not the case. People are
dedicated, but they mostly do not have the time or knowledge to adequately run their system
and keep up on all the paperwork. One manager described their situation as,
-

Well, considering I am by no means any kind of an expert on these matters. They
needed somebody to sign checks some time ago, and so I said, "Well, I guess I could
do that," and I got in the water board, so I became the chairman. And like the
president and some other institutions in our world, I don't know anything.

Water boards for MDWCAs might do better if members delegated tasks, but as one
interviewee said, “most of the time, in the boards, you maybe have three to five members in
these small systems, but you only have one person that does everything.” This lack of human
resources contributes to the vulnerability of this social-ecological system.
Water system managers are tasked with many natural problems such as deteriorating
infrastructure and environmental concerns, but the larger issues seem to be “constructed
problems.” Issues such as navigating bureaucracy and not having people to manage systems
because they are not paid, are not necessarily inherent in the interactions between the
ecosystem service of providing the resource and the users of that resource. These problems
have been constructed by governing institutions. The environmental regulations, financial
regulations, and funding sources are not in themselves problematic, but the issue is that
communities don’t have the resources to navigate the confusing nature of them. To be clear,
most managers were not arguing for decreased or no regulation, they would just like it to be
easier to comply with. This could be done by streamlining and consolidating the processes
and reporting requirements, or it could be done by giving small water systems more
resources.
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These constructed issues, as well as more tangible issues of deteriorating infrastructure and
environmental threats are contributing to the vulnerability of rural drinking water systems in
New Mexico. Water system managers are not able to adequately address these longer-term
issues because they are spending so much effort on the constructed issues. The state and
federal governments have power over drinking water systems, and they see water quality and
financial fraud as big issues. Water system managers agree that these are issues, but for
them, they are not as big of issues as the issues that the state created by try to solve them.
Water system managers only have so much capacity and requiring them to put in more effort
into the issues the state believes are important, makes it so they are putting less time into
other issues that could be more important from other perspectives. The government is
creating vulnerability by having managers spend time on issues they believe to be important,
which then take attention away from longer-term issues that can have significant negative
impacts down the road. However, the government does not want to have less strict
regulations for rural communities than urban ones, as that would create inequities and
environmental justice issues.
Not having enough people to run water systems decreases their capacity to adapt to stresses
that may be caused by deteriorating infrastructure or the environment. The state government
and other organizations are promoting the idea of regionalization as a way to increase
adaptive capacity. Regionalization may refer to neighboring water systems physically
connecting their pipes, or it can refer to increased cooperation or sharing of resources. By
doing this, they are trying to make rural water system more like urban ones, which decreases
the differences in abilities to satisfy regulatory burdens. Officially, regionalization is being
promoted for capacity development, which is the idea that water systems develop adequate
technical, managerial, and financial capacity to maintain their systems (EPA. Building the
Capacity of Drinking Water Systems). By consolidating resources and achieving economies
of scale, systems are better able to sustain their operation.
Drinking water system managers usually had strong opinions, either positive or negative,
about regionalization. All of the interviewees who expressed positive sentiment about
regionalization did have some reservations, but they thought aspects of regionalization could
be very positive for their community. One interviewee described the dynamics of small rural
communities by saying,
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-

The young people leave. They come to Albuquerque, Las Cruces, or they leave the
state. And so, what we see happening with the rural communities are smaller or older
people who live there on a very fixed income, so you don't have a lot of people to pay
to replace the capital to replace pumps and drill wells. You don't have a lot of people
who understand, who can navigate through the financial part of managing a system or
reporting to the state.

This interviewee brought up many of the same points that the state brings up when they are
promoting regionalization. Another interviewee described that if the state set up a regional
office it could create employment opportunities by saying,
-

And the other point that I think that would be positive one, regionalization, you'd
probably employ three or four people, a water operator, an accountant, that could go
around and check each and every well house and the upkeep of it. So, it would
actually create full time employment, which, in this area, most people commute out.
There's not a lot of employment here.

Another reason why they thought it could be beneficial is because of the amount of
responsibility that they have, and they would really like the state or some other entity to take
on some of that responsibility. However, people may want to give the state more
responsibility, but they don’t want to give them control. Expressing their skepticism, one
interviewee stated,
-

I think, like I said before, I think I will love their help, but not as a regional. I would
love for them to come and say, "What do people need? How can we help you?" But
not say "You're going to have to join my club and we're going to make the rules, and
you're going to follow my rules. And if you're not, you're out of the system." No, I
don't want that. We all... We've got our own rules, but we do need their help,
monetary, maybe even designing, they got designs, they got everything. Lawyers,
those things we can use from them, but as for us to become one region. No, I'll
never... Not on my watch. I will protest it. Really, I will protest.

Almost all interviewees expressed the importance of having local control of their water
system. One reason for this was having good community relations. One interviewee
described this by giving the example of, “‘Oh my God, grandma left her water on, what can
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we do?’ I can solve that problem in three minutes. Could you imagine trying to solve that if it
had to go to some other mechanism?” Having local control is also important because of the
need of having intimate knowledge of how a system runs. When discussing regional
management, one interviewee said, “I don't know how they could do that. There's a lot of
little different systems, but they all have different situations. It's not like buying a pair of
socks where one-size-fits-all. It doesn't work that way.”
One of the biggest reasons why people are hesitant to regionalize is because of trust and
independence. They were skeptical of the state government and trusting neighboring
communities if they took on more of a role. A lot of the skepticism was due to water rights
and financials with either the state or a neighboring community trying to take water rights or
using them to subsidize their customers or pay off a loan. For many communities, water is
cultural, and it is important for them to manage their water system because of what that
means to their community. One manager expressed their opinion of the government by
saying,
-

I don't want that to happen at all because every time the government steps in and does
something they make it expensive, inefficient, and unreliable. I don't necessarily want
to give up all my power. I just want to give up the responsibility and work.

Although the state is trying to promote regionalization as a formal agreement, many water
systems are already informally regionalized. They may share parts, ask for help from other
managers and operators, and receive new information and ideas from each other. An
interviewee described this by saying,
-

We have relied on them. We had a deal here where we lost our operator and had to
call another system and they came in before we had this operator that we have now. I
had to call him in to help us out and he did. They were very good people. They didn't
want anything from us in payment or anything like that. They just came to help.

Another interviewee said, “That's what's nice about being small communities, we still help
out each other.” When discussing the manager of a neighboring system, one interviewee
said, “Without that leadership, guidance, and experience we'd be hosed. Having to figure it
out for yourself and cover all your bases? I can't imagine.”
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Because water system managers are facing so many challenges, they seem to be turning to
their neighbors for assistance. This may have always happened, but currently, the conditions
seem right for neighboring communities to self-organize into informal regional operations
that may simply share knowledge or even share parts, labor, and water.
By formally consolidating resources and increasing the rate base, state agencies and some
NGOs believe that systems will decrease their sensitivity to perturbations and increase their
adaptive capacity. It is my view that regionalization is a tool that can be helpful in some
situations, but I believe it should not be pursued as a blanket policy for all water systems. By
doing this, other important aspects of vulnerability are being ignored, including what local
control of water means to communities, how communities view their sovereignty and state
control, the histories of community’s relationship with the government and other
communities, and the socioeconomic status of the communities that may be most vulnerable.
The managers who said they were open to regionalization were also the ones who said
residents don’t think about water after they turn off the tap. Managers who were against
regionalization generally said that their community highly values water and people do think
about it, even when they turn off the tap.
The water systems that seem to be the most vulnerable are MDWCAs. They are among the
smallest and are subjected to as much regulation as larger municipalities. Generally, they are
in communities that have low median household income and communities that are
predominantly Hispanic. Because of this, the vulnerability of rural drinking water systems in
New Mexico is a social justice issue. Because they have less wealthy residents and have
challenges receiving funding, they are the systems that seem to be applying more
“infrastructure bandages” on their aging water systems. When describing what new
infrastructure would mean to a community, an interviewee said,
-

That means less electricity, less the pumps would wear out as fast, less maintenance
bills. I remember hearing something years ago that it costs a lot of money to be poor.
And you know it really does. And I really feel that's what how it is for this, for a lot
of rural communities. You know their water systems, even their water systems. So
that's what worries me. That's what keeps me up at night.

30

Water quality regulations are positive for public health, and financial regulations and
auditing are positive due to the improved fiscal responsibility and decreased embezzlement,
but how these regulations are administered is a problem. Because policies and excessive
bureaucracy are making rural drinking water systems more vulnerable, who is drinking water
governance really for? Instead of government agencies serving and promoting the existence
rural drinking water systems, the situation has flipped so that water systems seem to be
serving and promoting the existence of governing institutions.
However, there is no single entity that is at fault for this situation. I do not want to sound
necessarily anti-government and do not think the New Mexico state government is at fault for
this situation. The institutional structure of MDWCAs was created in 1947 to give state
resources to rural and poor communities to improve their drinking water infrastructure in
order to promote community health (Clark 1987). This situation may have originally been
successful, but the problem seems to be that throughout the years, so much regulation has
been placed on these water systems from institutions at the state and federal level that they
are no longer able to satisfy them, and for all the reasons discussed, are starting to fail.
Among managers and state officials, there is the general sentiment that some small rural
water systems are starting to fail. However, they may fail in terms of meeting requirements
and regulations, but I believe they are likely going to continue providing water for their
communities. Many of the water system run by the interviewed managers had recent
violations, with some of them having many violations. Even though these water systems
were in violation, they were still delivering water to their residents that they claimed was safe
and of high quality. Most of the violations listed on NMED’s Drinking Water Watch
database for the water systems we interviewed are minor violations relating to missed test or
reporting deficiencies that do not necessarily jeopardize people’s health. For all water
systems, Administrative Compliance Orders and violations for community water systems
sometimes include a water quality violation, but most of the violations are related to missing
water quality tests, not notifying the public of missed tests, or not distributing Consumer
Confidence Reports (CCRs) to residents (New Mexico Environment Department,
Enforcement Actions). Although these requirements are important, it does not necessarily
mean that water systems are not delivering safe water.
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A community and its residents need water to survive, so people will go to great lengths to
provide water. Although they are getting burnt out, mangers are very dedicated to their
communities. One manager said, “It's kind of like we're doing this for our community, for
the good of the community and what's the point? Nobody wants to participate.” Other
managers said the reason they did it is because no one else would, so they were the ones to
step up to the plate. Although some systems really do not have anyone to run them, it seems
like for most of them someone will make sure that residents receive drinking water. As one
manager said,
-

But it is people from the community kind of rising to the occasion, to the need. Then
it's like, "Okay, we've got to have water if we're going to be here, we've got to have
water." And somehow decade by decade we've managed to do it. It's funny, I mean, I
kind of see myself as like in a line of people, going back further than I know and
hopefully going on into the future. We've got issues we've got to solve, but there's
been enough community spirit to sustain it so far.

Chapter 1 Conclusion
The majority of the 570 community drinking water systems in New Mexico are small and
rural. Because there is a trend of drinking water systems across the US not performing well,
especially in small rural communities and in the Southwest US (Allaire et al. 2018), it is
important to see what challenges the actual managers of rural drinking water systems in New
Mexico are faced with. To do this, our research team interviewed managers of rural drinking
water systems all across New Mexico. We found six main concerns, which were lack of
personnel and engaged citizens, deteriorating infrastructure, lack of funds and difficulty
receiving outside funding, overly burdensome and confusing regulation, environmental
concerns, including drought, wildfire, and contamination, and concerns of having enough
water rights or losing water rights. Water system managers were doing a wide variety of
things to counter these threats, including informally collaborating with neighboring
communities. We found that although many of these issues seem to be separate, they are
very much related. The biggest example of this is how small communities are struggling to
find people to run their water systems. This is largely because the people who are running
them have to deal with all the other issues, and most of the time they are volunteers.
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Although some of the problems that water managers are facing are more tangible, such as
aging infrastructure and environmental concerns, many of their problems are constructed.
These constructed problems include overly burdensome regulations, difficulties receiving
funding, and concerns over water rights, which all then in turn contribute to the problem of
not having enough people to run the water system. The federal government, through the Safe
Drinking Water Act which is enforced by the state of New Mexico, has decided that water
quality is a big issue and the state government has decided financial fraud is a big issue, and
because of these issues they created regulation to address them. Because governments have
more power than drinking water systems, they have more of a say in what are and are not
issues from a regulatory standpoint. Our interviews show that water system managers
generally do not think they are as big of issues as the issues that were created by the
regulatory burden, at least for water systems of their size. Because managers are spending so
much effort on satisfying their regulatory requirements, they are spending less effort dealing
with other problems, specifically aging infrastructure and environmental threats. Through
this process, the state regulating agencies are creating vulnerability for small and rural
drinking water systems. Vulnerability is increased by making systems more exposed to
infrastructure or environment related disturbances. It is also increased by water system’s
decreased adaptive capacity caused by there being less people willing to be involved in
running the system. This lack of people being involved is a problem created by the huge
amount of work it is to manage a water system, which is partially due to the regulatory
burden and difficulty in navigating bureaucracy.
If governing agencies are increasing the vulnerability of rural drinking water systems, then
what is their function? They do serve an important role, but the execution of their policies
seems to be in a way that is not actually advantageous for small communities or their
drinking water systems. The reason for this is not due to there not being a need for
regulation or that the state agencies are doing a poor job; rather, it is because institutional
structures that may have once been successful are now outdated. This situation makes it so
instead of state agencies working to promote the existence of rural drinking water systems,
rural drinking water systems are now working to maintain the existence of state agencies.
This situation is not beneficial for small rural communities, and the ones that seem to be
affecting the most are lower income and predominantly Hispanic communities.
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However, as I argued, communities are likely to continue to deliver water to their residents.
And although it might not be tested, it will largely be the same water that they have been
delivering for years. Many managers believed that something is going to have to change
soon, which possibly means their systems looking more like larger urban systems. When
discussing either giving water systems more resources or having the state take over their
system, one manger said:
-

So I believe that's going to happen at some point. I think it's inevitable. I might not be
around to see it, but I just don't see any other way unless they can provide the
resources to hire people that are qualified to stay on top of all this stuff. So in a sense,
it's the same thing.

In the end many managers thought that either the state is going to have to give them more
resources, they are going to have to take over the system, or systems will no longer be able to
be in compliance with regulations. There is irony in that increased bureaucracy and
regulations may in fact make systems more vulnerable and less likely to succeed in satisfying
regulations.
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Chapter 2
Shifting of power dynamics through institutional work
Chapter 2 Introduction
Like many water systems across the United States, rural drinking water systems in New
Mexico face numerous challenges in delivering safe drinking water to households. These
challenges can include water quantity, water quality, finance, regulation, and public relations.
These issues can be greater in rural areas than in urban settings for numerous reasons,
including access to resources, expertise, and capital (Mosheim & Ribaudo 2017). Resources
available for water systems are largely determined by institutions. Institutions are defined as
rules and norms and determine who holds decision making power (North 1991; Ostrom
1990). In this case, this includes the higher up governing institutions such as the state
government and non-governmental organization (NGOs), and includes the institutional
structures of the water systems themselves, such as cooperatives, privately owned systems, or
Mutual Domestic Water Consumers Associations.
Government agencies and NGOs play a large role in how water systems are managed in New
Mexico. Different government and NGO institutions have different functions and
relationships with rural drinking water systems. What are these institutions and how do they
shape the communities and water systems that they serve?
The institutional structures of drinking water systems themselves also have a large role in
how systems navigate different challenges. What are the circumstances that have influenced
why a community chose a specific institutional structure for their drinking water system?
How does the institutional structure of a community drinking water system influence its
ability to meet its goals?
As I will show, community water systems chose their institutional structures based on
population, income, and possibly other unknown factors. The institutional structure of a
water system has a substantial impact on the ability of a community to meet its water-related
goals because it dictates what rules they must follow, what resources are available to them,
and how much regulation they must comply with. I found that water systems with the
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institutional structure of Mutual Domestic Water Consumers Association (MDWCA) seem to
be having the most challenges because they are among the smallest communities but have the
same regulatory burden as larger municipalities. They are not able to pay board members, so
the people managing the systems are volunteers and take on a significant amount of work and
responsibility. Because MDWCAs are typically in lower income and predominantly
Hispanic communities, the institutional structure of MDWCA is racially discriminatory.
Through overly burdensome and confusing regulation, governing state institutions are
creating challenging hurdles for MDWCAs and because of this it seems that instead of state
governing institutions serving for the existence of drinking water systems, water systems,
especially MDWCAs, are serving for the existence of the governing institutions.
To argue this point, I use the theoretical lens of institutional work, which is the idea that all
purposive activity happening around an institution is either creating, maintaining, or
disrupting that institution (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009). The institutional structure
of MDWCA was created in 1947 to help rural New Mexico communities improve drinking
water systems to promote public health (Clark 1987). After this institution was created,
purposive work has been consistently acted upon it through increased regulatory
requirements, increased number of water systems under this structure, and more state
governing institutions becoming involved. Actions that seem tangential and benign to the
institution of MDWCA, such as water quality regulations, have had significant impacts to
how MDWCAs function. This institutional work has gradually shifted the power balance
away from rural water system and to the state government. Even though the legal statute for
MDWCAs has remained relatively constant, tangential actions have made the institution of
MDWCA greatly shift. These actions have also reinforced and created institutional
momentum for MDWCA, so that even though it is quite problematic, it is a strong institution
and continues to exist. It would take a great deal of disrupting institutional work to create
significant change on the institutional structure of MDWCA and how drinking water in
general is governed in New Mexico.
To explain this situation, I first take a deeper dive into the concepts of institutions and
institutional work. I then examine the institutional structures of drinking water systems in
New Mexico and the various governing institutions. For my qualitative field research, I
conducted in-person interviews of managers of rural drinking water systems across the state
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to get their take on institutional dynamics and what their biggest needs and concerns are for
their water system. Because the institutional structure of a water system was determined to
be very important for a water system’s success, I perform a quantitative analysis of where
water systems of different institutional structures are located. Because MDWCAs were
found to be clustered, I quantitatively examine demographics of communities they serve and
found that communities with MDWCAs typically serve lower income and predominantly
Hispanic communities. In the discussion section of this paper, I discuss how finances and
regulations are affecting water systems in various ways. These issues create problematic
power dynamics between regulatory agencies and water systems that are not contributing to
the success of drinking water systems. One important aspect of this power dynamic is the
promotion of regional water systems by the state government and certain NGOs. I then use
all these findings and the theoretical lens of institutional work to discuss how power has
shifted toward the state government, why the institutional structure of MDWCA is racially
discriminatory, and how water systems seem to be serving for the existence of state
governing institutions, instead of the other way around.

Institutions governing social-ecological systems
To understand the relationship between the ability of a community drinking water system to
meet its goals and the governing institutions and institutional structure of that system we
must first explore how institutions relate to the management of social-ecological systems. A
drinking water system can be described as a social-ecological system because it consists of a
resource provided by an ecosystem and users who utilize that resource. Institutions are the
rules and norms that affect how users interact with each other and with the resource.
Institutions are defined as “the formal and informal rules and norms that guide human and
organizational behavior and provide a degree of stability and predictability in social
interactions” (Beunen and Patterson 2016). Bates (1994) argues that institutions are created
when individualism clashes with social welfare. Rational individuals make choices that are
socially irrational and to remedy this disconnect, institutions are created (Bates 1994). These
institutions may be cultural norms, mutual agreements, or governmental control.
In his famous article, which is now seen as dated and problematic, Hardin (1968) describes
what he calls “the tragedy of the commons” which is the idea that without institutional
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regulations in place, individual users will exploit a common-pool resource and the result will
be a tragedy, or a deterioration, of that common-pool resource. To remedy this situation
Hardin proposed an institution; in this case the institution of private property (Hardin 1968).
Since his article was published, many people have responded and countered it. In addition to
rebuking his claims that government intervention and private property was needed to govern
common-pool resources, his work has been criticized as being racist. The Southern Poverty
Law Center has identified him as a white nationalist and argues that he used his work to
promote population control through forced sterilization of women, specifically women of
color (SPLC, Garret Hardin). This is just one example of how entities use institutions to
promote a personal goal. In the most prominent rebuttal, Ostrom (1990) uses game theory
and gives examples to prove how groups can self-organize to obtain better societal outcomes
for a common pool resource. Ostrom advocates for collective management of common-pool
resources and gives eight rules that should be followed to have a successful institution.
These eight rules are: commons need to have clearly defined boundaries, rules should fit
local circumstances, participatory decision-making is vital, commons must be monitored,
sanctions for those who abuse the commons should be graduated, conflict resolution should
be easily accessible, commons need the right to organize, and commons work best when
nested within larger networks (Ostrom 1990). In most contexts, water can be considered a
common-pool resource and can be susceptible to the tragedy of the commons if the proper
institutions are not in place.
These studies and arguments show that there is no overall best institutional arrangement.
There is no water institution panacea; instead there are institutional arrangements that work
well in different ways for different situations (Meinzen-Dick 2007). For drinking water
systems in New Mexico, there are many different environmental and social variables present
and therefore there is not an overall ideal institutional arrangement. It is important however
to understand the variables that create ideal institutional arrangements for different contexts.
One arrangement that has gained recent attention is a polycentric governance structure
(Jordan et al. 2015; Berardo and Lubell 2016). “Polycentric connotes many centers of
decision making that are formally independent of each other… [t]o the extent that they take
each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and
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cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflict”
(Ostrom et al. 1961). The benefits of a polycentric governance system include increased
adaptation, trustworthiness, cooperation, innovation, and learning (Ostrom 2010).
Polycentric governance explicitly fits in to the eight rules presented by Ostrom (1990), in that
polycentric systems are systems that are nested within larger networks.
If the goal is to create a polycentric governance system, then it is important to understand
how institutions are created and how they change. Ostrom (2007) discusses the idea that
social, economic, and political settings influence the creation of institutions surrounding
social-ecological systems which include a resource system, resource units, a governance
system, and users. The interactions between the variables of these four entities create the
outcome of that social-ecological system, whether that outcome is desirable or not. Out of all
the sub-variables identified, ten are identified to affect the likelihood of self-organization to
achieve a sustainable SES (Ostrom 2009). These ten variables are the size of resource
system, productivity of the system, predictability of the system dynamics, resource unit
mobility, collective-choice rules, number of users, leadership/entrepreneurship, norms/social
capital, knowledge of the social-ecological system/mental models, and importance of
resource.
Other studies have been done on what makes a robust social-ecological system, which is
defined as “the maintenance of some desired system characteristics despite fluctuations in the
behavior of its component parts or its environment” (Carlson and Doyle 2002). Anderies et
al. (2004) identify the connections between resource, resource users, public infrastructure
providers, and public infrastructure as crucial connections. They argue that the weakening of
any of these connections makes the system less robust. Anderies and Janssen (2013) argue
that the public policy process itself is a social-ecological system, and advocate for creating
policies that are not necessarily the “right” policies, but ones that encourage experimentation,
learning, and adaptation. They also note that by creating robustness in one way,
vulnerabilities can be created in other ways. A good example of this can been seen in
Anderies (2006). In order to address short-term fluctuations in a social-ecological system,
institutions and infrastructure are created which may in turn make the whole system more
vulnerable to major disturbances. This is what Anderies (2006) argues happened to the
Hohokam in what is now Arizona. Irrigation institutions and infrastructure were created to
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decrease short-term water stress, and these made the system vulnerable to flooding, a larger
and more destructive disturbance.
New laws and new institutional arrangements should also take an ethical approach.
Groenfeldt and Schmidt (2013) argue for a “values-based approach” to water governance
where new water laws and institutions need to account for any externalities they create. In
their case, that meant leaving some water in the Santa Fe river for non-human life. Water
governance can also have surprising human consequences. Kuzdas et al. (2016) discuss how
water governance structures can help create or mitigate violence.
In sum, a generalized ideal water governance scenario has different institutions that make up
a polycentric structure, the institutions and the social-ecological system follow the eight rules
outlined by Ostrom (1990), the system is robust through strong connections between its
entities, and the laws are flexible and ethical.
When discussing how institutions are created or changed, it is useful to frame it using the
theoretical lens of institutional work, which is defined as “the purposive action of individuals
and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence &
Suddaby 2006, p. 215) As opposed to institutional change, institutional work also includes
the actions that work to reinforce the current institution. For example, institutional work
incorporates a situation where actors involved in an institution are performing actions that
create a positive feedback loop that continually strengthens that institution.
There are many theoretical ways that institutional work can lead to institutional change, one
of which is institutional momentum or inertia (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This is the
concept that the longer and more established an institution is, the harder it is to change it
(Pierson 2000). More altering institutional work is needed to change an institution that has
had more reinforcing institutional work. Another focus of research on institutional change
has been on whether institutions evolve slowly and incrementally or if they change abruptly
in dramatic fashion. Literature suggests it is likely some of both (Beunen and Patterson
2016). Incremental change can work in a positive feedback loop that then accumulates into a
dramatic change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Mahoney and Thelen (2010) suggest that
change is gradual and driven by political actors that take advantage of the flexibility of
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institutional rules. Dramatic change can also come from exogenous shocks from
environmental, social, economic, and political factors (Head 2014).
In sum, there are some main dichotomies present in the literature around institutional change
and institutional work. These dichotomies are “stability vs. radical change…, emergent vs.
intentional change…, and endogenous vs. exogenous drivers of change” (Beunen and
Patterson 2016, p. 5). In this paper, I identify the mechanisms of institutional work and
change for drinking water governance in New Mexico, with a focus on governing institutions
and the institutional structure of Mutual Domestic Water Consumers Associations.

Methodology
This research project used grounded theory and mixed methods. Grounded theory is defined
as, “a general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically
gathered and analyzed. Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through
continuous interplay between analysis and data collection” (Strauss & Corbin 1994). For this
project, using grounded theory meant that I initially went into the interviews without a theory
of their needs and concerns or what the institutional dynamics were. After numerous
interviews, I developed a theory and then used the subsequent interviews to test that theory.
Mixed method research is defined as “an approach to research in the social, behavioral, and
health sciences in which the investigator gathers both quantitative (close-ended) and
qualitative (open-ended) data, integrates the two and then draws interpretations based on the
combined strengths of both sets of data to understand research problems” (Creswell 2014, p.
2). My mixed methods approach means that I used the qualitative data of in-person
interviews with water system managers and quantitative data of water system information
and demographic information. Combining grounded theory and mixed methods means that I
started my research with quantitative and qualitative data and throughout the research, they
constantly informed the direction of one another and were each testing the theories that were
developed.
Qualitative methods include interviews with rural drinking water system managers and
analysis of documents and literature from governing institutions. Quantitative methods
consist of a spatial analysis of institutional structures of water systems and other
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characteristics of those areas. The interviews were open ended for me to learn from the
drinking water system managers themselves and those conversations then directed me to
what governing institutions should be examined and what factors were important for the
spatial analysis.
The interview process consisted of six in-person interviews with water experts from various
governing entities and 30 in-person interviews with drinking water system managers across
all regions of New Mexico. All 570 community drinking water systems were randomized
and systems serving more than 5,000 people were eliminated, as that was the cutoff for a
small system, going off the definition of a small water system used by New Mexico Rural
Water Association. Starting at the beginning of the list we emailed and called the
administrative contacts for the water systems and then scheduled an in-person interview. The
administrative contact held different positions for different water systems. Most commonly,
the administrative contact was the president of the water association board or the public
works person for a municipality. On a rare occasion, the administrative contact was the
water system operator or the accountant and when this was the case, they usually referred us
to someone who was more involved with day-to-day operations of the system. Our attempt
was to interview the person most familiar with the system and responsible for meeting state
regulations. This person did hold different positions but is referred to in this paper as the
“manager.” Often times, we interviewed many people involved with the water system, such
as the board president, other board members, operators, and accountants.
Water systems on tribal land were not included in this study. Drinking water systems on
Reservations or Pueblos are not governed by the New Mexico Environment Department and
have a different institutional and regulatory environment. Additional barriers exist in
conducting research on tribal land, including needing permission from each Tribe or Pueblo.
Because of the added research challenges and different institutional environment, drinking
water governance on tribal land is not included in this study.
All the interviews were transcribed and then coded into themes using the qualitative research
software NVivo 12. The interviews informed me which governing institutions warranted
further research and which spatial variables were relevant. Data on individual water systems
was obtained from the Drinking Water Watch database through the New Mexico
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Environment Department (NMED) (https://dww.water.net.env.nm.gov/NMDWW/). A
public records request was submitted in order to obtain the data in a more usable format. The
institutional structure of water systems was found through the New Mexico Secretary of
State’s website (https://portal.sos.state.nm.us/BFS/online/CorporationBusinessSearch).
Water rate survey data was obtained from the NMED website
(https://www.env.nm.gov/drinking_water/rates/). Demographic data was from the US
Census American Community Survey 5-year average from 2012 to 2017. Supplemental
mapping data was obtained from New Mexico Resource Geographic Information
(https://rgis.unm.edu/).
Water systems are unique spatial entities because they do not necessarily follow any kind of
political boundary. My maps of water systems were created using ArcMap GIS 10.6 by
taking the coordinates of every drinking water related piece of infrastructure in the state and
finding the median center of those points for individual water systems. This then created one
point for each water system. A problem arises when comparing water system data to other
spatial data, particularly US Census block group data. When these datasets were spatially
joined, the water system received the value of the block group that the one point for that
water system fell in. This is not a problem for small communities, but it is less accurate for
larger systems. Because the focus of this project is small rural water systems, this method
was determined to be the best method for analysis.

Analysis and Results
Water Governing Institutions in New Mexico
The interviews with managers of drinking water systems reveal that there are multiple
agencies of the New Mexico state government that they regularly interact with. These
include the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) Drinking Water Bureau, New
Mexico Finance Authority (NMFA), New Mexico Department of Finance & Administration
(NM DFA), the Office of the State Engineer (OSE), and the Office of the State Auditor
(OSA). Other state agencies are involved with drinking water governance, but these are the
ones that managers discussed the most. According to the managers, they interact with the
agencies in the following ways:
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•

NMED is the agency tasked with regulation of issues like water quality and water
operator certification.

•

The NMFA and NM DFA are largely involved in financing grants and loans for water
and community development related projects.

•

The OSE oversees water rights.

•

The OSA makes sure that water systems are audited so they can receive government
funds.

The NMED is the state agency tasked with enforcing regulation passed by the federal Safe
Drinking Water Act (1974, 1986, 1996). Multiple United States federal agencies are
involved in governance of drinking water systems in New Mexico, most notably the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Agriculture.
In addition to government agencies, not-for-profit non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
are involved in offering assistance and resources to rural drinking water systems. The
organizations that were discussed most often in interviews are the New Mexico Rural Water
Association (NMRWA) and Rural Community Assistance Corporation (commonly known as
RCAC). NMRWA is the New Mexico branch of the National Rural Water Association
whereas RCAC is the western US division of the Rural Community Assistance Partnership.
All of these agencies and organizations are considered institutions because they have power
to create the rules and norms that govern drinking water systems.
One of the most important roles for all the governing institutions is to provide money through
grants and loans to assist in the operation and improvement of water systems. According to
the Environmental Finance Center Network (2019), community drinking water systems in
New Mexico have 34 different available funding mechanisms.

Institutional Structures of Community Drinking Water Systems in New Mexico
The eligibility of a community drinking water system to receive assistance from agencies and
receive funding from different sources is largely based on its institutional structure. Every
drinking water system in New Mexico must be organized as one of a number of different
institutional structures that were created by the New Mexico Legislature. The most
numerous and prominent institutional structures are Mutual Domestic Water Consumers
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Associations (MDWCAs), Water and Sanitation Districts (WSD), Cooperatives, Non-profit
Corporations, Investor Owned, and Municipally Owned.
MDWCAs are the most prevalent and account for 37 percent of the 570 community drinking
water systems in the state. This structure was created by a legislative statute in 1947 with the
purpose of giving resources to poor and rural communities so they could improve their
drinking water infrastructure to provide safe drinking water to their communities (Clark
1987). Before this measure, most rural communities were drinking water from ditches,
rivers, and shallow wells. The 1947 statute was updated and called the Sanitary Projects Act
in 1965, although nowhere in the act does it say the phrase “mutual domestic” (FlynnO’Brian & O’Leary 2005). The act has had numerous amendments, but the basic goals have
remained the same. The creation of MDWCAs has largely been regarded as a success. In his
foundational book, Water in New Mexico, Ira Clark describes MDWCAs in the following
way:
-

The speed with which local groups throughout the state organized mutual
domestic water consumers' associations was indicative of the void which had
existed. By the end of 1969, 139 had been completed to serve 5,477 families at a
cost to the state of $1,187,000. These have brought water and sanitary facilities to
low-income areas which would never have been able to afford them if left to their
own resources alone, and have contributed significantly to promoting cooperative
effort among rural residents in solving their common local problems. (Clark 1987,
p. 360)

MDWCAs, as well as WSDs, are technically subdivisions of the state government. Because
of this, they are eligible for more sources of state funds than other institutional structures.
The main difference between MDWCAs and WSDs is that WSDs are able to provide
wastewater treatment in addition to drinking water and operate more like a local government.
Cooperatives are a common institutional structure of drinking water systems across the state
and these are organized like cooperatives in other sectors; they are private entities where each
member is partial owner. Because they are considered a private entity, they are not eligible
for as many funding streams as MDWCAs, but they also are not subjected to as much
financial regulation. Non-profit Corporations are also private entities, but they are not
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necessarily collectively owned by the individual users of the water system. Investor owned
systems are water systems that are privately owned by an individual or corporation that is
looking to profit by selling water to consumers. Water systems of this institutional structure
have even further limited grant and loan options. The last prominent institutional structure is
municipally owned water systems and the people running these systems may be involved in
numerous municipal functions, including wastewater and parks. As a local government, they
are eligible for numerous loans and grants.
The report Water and Wastewater Systems of New Mexico (Flynn-O’Brian & O’Leary 2005)
gives statutory details for all the different possible institutional structures for community
water systems. From their statutory review, they find that the institutional structure of a
water system is not always clear, and they find that some statutes do not specify if an
institutional structure is considered a public or private entity, which would affect its reporting
requirements and funding options.
Because all these different institutional structures of community drinking water systems in
New Mexico have different mechanisms of funding and different reporting requirements, it is
important to analyze how funding and assistance are helping communities and how
regulations are affecting them. On top of this, it is important to see which communities have
different institutional structures and if there are any patterns.

Spatial and Quantitative Analysis
For my quantitative analysis, I first look at where water systems with different institutional
structures were located. For reference, I include a general map of New Mexico that includes
labels of counties and select municipalities (Figure 1). With data obtained from NMED, I
plotted the locations of all water systems in New Mexico, shown as Figure 2 below.
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Figure 1 - Reference Map of New Mexico
Data Source: New Mexico Resource Geographic Information System
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Population
served by
water
system

0 – 130
131 – 155
156 – 286
287 – 961
962 – 4456

Percentage of
water
systems that
are MDWCAs

4457 – 22559
22560 – 116325
116356 - 601983
Figure 2 - Distribution of institutional structures of water systems in New Mexico. Colored circles represent
different institutional structure and the size of circle represents the population served by each water system.
Purple shaded regions represent the percentage of water systems in that county that are MDWCAs. State
average is 37 percent.
Data source: New Mexico Environment Department. Drinking Water Watch.; New Mexico Resource Geographic
Information System.; New Mexico Secretary of State.

The color of the dot represents the institutional structure and the size of the dot represents the
population served. This analysis appears to show that institutional structures are spatially
clustered. To see if this clustering was significant, I calculated the percentage of water
systems in each county that were organized as MDWCAs. For the entire state, an average of
37 percent of water systems are MDWCAs, so that is the cutoff for the lighter and darker
shades of purple on the map to visualize what location are higher than average and lower
than average. Water systems in the counties of north-central NM are more likely to be
MDWCAs than other institutional structures. Global Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation test
was used to determine clustering significance. With a p-value of 0.052 there is less than a
ten percent chance that clustering on the county level is random. The same test was done
with MDWCAs per census block group and that resulted in a p-value of <0.01, which shows
that there is less than a one percent chance that clustering is random. The takeaway from this
analysis is that the choosing of institutional structure by a water system is not random, there
must be certain factors that influence it.
Next, I used data from the US Census American Community Survey to see the relationship
between institutional structure and demographic information, specifically median household
income and percent Hispanic population (2012 to 2017 average). The maps of median
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household income per water system and percent Hispanic population per water system can be
seen below as Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.
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Figure 3 - Median household income of US Census Block
Group served by water system.
Data source: New Mexico Environment Department. Drinking
Water Watch.; New Mexico Resource Geographic
Information System.; US Census American Community Survey,
Median Household

Median
Household
Income
(US dollars)
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Figure 4 - Percent of residents of Hispanic or Latino origin of US
Census Block Group served by water system.
Data source: New Mexico Environment Department. Drinking Water
Watch.; New Mexico Resource Geographic Information System.; US
Census American Community, Hispanic or Latino Origin 2012-2017 5year estimate.

Percent
Hispanic
Population
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Graphs were made comparing the median of median household incomes for each type of
institutional structure and the median percent Hispanic population for each institutional
structure. Figure 5 shows that communities with MDWCAs have the lowest median
household income of any institutional structure. Figure 6 shows that MDWCAs have the
highest percent Hispanic population of any institutional structure.

Median household income for each institutional structure
70000
60000

US Dollars

50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
MDWCA

WSD

Cooperative

Non-profit

Investor Owned

Municipal

Figure 5 - Median household income of US Census Block Group served by water system.
Data source: New Mexico Environment Department. Drinking Water Watch.; New Mexico Resource Geographic
Information System.; US Census American Community Survey, Median Household Income 2012-2017 5-year
estimate.
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Figure 6 - Percent of residents of Hispanic or Latino origin of US Census Block Group served by water system.
Data source: New Mexico Environment Department. Drinking Water Watch.; US Census American Community
Survey, Hispanic or Latino Origin 2012-2017 5-year estimate.

To see if more funding options for MDWCAs translated to lower water rates, I used 2018
water rate data from NMED and created a graph of median monthly water rate for each
institutional structure; seen below as Figure 7. This graph shows that water rates for
MDWCAs are among the highest. I then normalized this data with the median household
income data to see what percentage of household income was going towards a water bill;
seen below as Figure 8. This graph shows that communities with MDWCAs pay a much
higher percent of their household income to their water bill than communities with water
systems of other institutional structures.
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Median residential monthly water bill for each institutional
structure
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Figure 7 - Median residential monthly water bill for water systems of different institutional structures.
Data source: New Mexico Environment Department. Drinking Water Watch.; New Mexico Environment
Department. Water and Sewer Rate Surveys. 2018 Survey Results
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Figure 8 - 2018 water rate survey results divided by median household income for US Census Block Group
served for each institutional structure.
Data source: New Mexico Environment Department. Drinking Water Watch.; New Mexico Environment
Department. Water and Sewer Rate Surveys. 2018 Survey Results. US Census American Community Survey,
Median Household Income 2012-2017 5-year estimate.
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Interview Results
The purpose of the interviews was to get a perspective on drinking water governance from
managers of drinking water systems and learn about their needs and concerns, and to see how
they differed between institutional structures. All six of the major institutional structures
previously discussed were included in the interviews.
Seven major themes emerged from the interviews with managers of the water systems.
These include:
•

Not enough local people engaged in running the water system

•

Lack of funds and difficulty receiving outside funding

•

Deteriorating infrastructure

•

Confusing and burdensome regulation

•

Environmental concerns, including drought, wildfire, and contamination

•

Concerns of having enough water rights or losing water rights

•

Regionalization as either a solution or a threat

Some of these topics were much more of an issue for some drinking water systems than
others for reasons unrelated to the institutional structure, but the institutional structure did
have a significant role in how systems navigate all these topics.
With a few exceptions, the water systems whose managers we interviewed were formed long
before the current manager was involved, and they did not know why the institutional
structure of their water system was chosen. Although, some managers did have a good idea
of why that structure was chosen, and the characteristics of water systems do seem to
corroborate these observations. The choosing of an institutional structure can largely be
attributed to demographics. The first, and perhaps simplest, variable is the number of
residents served. Out of the six major rural institutional structures, a few of them have a
significantly different number of residents served. A graph of the median number of
residents served can be seen below as Figure 9.
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Figure 9 - Median population served for each institutional structure.
Data source: New Mexico Environment Department. Drinking Water Watch.

Municipally managed systems are much larger than all the other categories. These
communities are large enough to have a municipal government that manages many town
functions, including a drinking water system. The second largest median population served
is Water and Sanitation Districts (WSDs). These communities tend to be slightly larger than
the other institutional structures because they also can manage wastewater facilities, but they
are not large enough to warrant a whole municipal government. MDWCAs, Cooperatives,
Non-profits, and Investor Owned systems tend to be the smallest and houses are generally on
individual septic systems.
Median household income (figure 5) distinguishes MDWCAs from the other institutional
structures that serve the smallest communities. MDWCAs have the lowest median
household income whereas Cooperatives have the highest. Non-profits and Investor Owned
Systems are somewhere in-between. It is expected that MDWCAs serve lower income
communities, as the original goal of MDWCAs was to improve drinking water for lower
income communities (Clark 1987). It is also expected that Cooperatives serve higher income
communities because they are likely to be more self-sufficient in fund generation because
they are less able to receive monetary resources from the state. Cooperatives are technically
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member-owned private entities, so they are subject to less fiscal regulation. The reasons why
a community might choose Non-profit or Investor Owned as an institutional structure
remains unknown.

Discussion
Finances and regulations
The main ways that governing institutions interact differently with different institutional
structures are though funding of grants and loans, financial regulation, and regulation of
water system by-laws and management. There are 34 different funding mechanisms for
drinking water systems in New Mexico, identified by the Environmental Finance Center
Network (2019), but not all of them are available to each institutional structure. Most
notably, MDWCAs are subdivisions of the state government, so therefore are eligible for
much more funding options than Cooperatives and Investor Owned systems, which are
considered private water systems. MDWCAs are also the most numerous type of
institutional structure so they often get more attention when talking to state water officials.
All community water systems are subject to water quality regulation under the federal Safe
Drinking Water Act (1974, 1986, 1996), but different institutional structures are subject to
different amounts of financial regulation. Because MDWCAs and WSDs are subdivisions of
the state government and because water systems have a history of embezzlement, they must
be audited on a regular basis by a CPA. If they want to be eligible for any state funding, they
must have their audits up to date and audits cost a significant amount of money for small
water systems. Does their eligibility for state funds make up for this increased financial
regulation? To answer this question, I obtained NMED survey data from water systems
which showed how much each drinking water system was charging for 6000 gallons of
monthly water use. The results, as seen in figure 7, show that the water rates for MDWCAs
and Cooperatives are the highest out of all the institutional structures at about $40 per month.
The finding that water rates for MDWCAs are among the highest and equal to that of
Cooperatives is significant for several reasons. First, it shows that even though MDWCAs
are supposedly offered more financial assistance, it doesn’t appear to be making drinking
water any more affordable in those communities. Second, communities with MDWCAs tend
to have a lower household income as seen in figure 5, which therefore means that they are
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paying a significantly higher percentage of their monthly income for their drinking water. As
shown in figure 8, households in communities with MDWCAs are paying over 1.2 percent of
median household income for their water bill whereas households for all the other
institutional structures are paying less than 0.9 percent. In sum, the communities with
MDWCAs are subject to much more oversight and regulation and they are paying the highest
relative price for their drinking water.
Smaller economies of scale for MDWCAs can explain part of the rate discrepancy, but it
does not completely explain it. Water rates are lowest for municipally owned systems, which
serve higher populations and have more rate payers. However, the second lowest rates are
for investor owned systems, which serve communities of similar size to MDWCAs. Water
rates for MDWCAs are among the highest for all institutional structures, so if the increased
access to state resources was effective in decreasing cost to the community, their water rates
should be at least not among the highest. The institutional structure with rates slightly higher
than MCWCAs is Cooperatives, which are considered private entities and receive among the
least amount of state resources. Non-profits and investor owned systems are of similar size
to MDWCAs and have lower water rates and have less access to state resources than
MDWCAs.
For any water system, complying with all regulations is time consuming and takes a
significant amount of effort and familiarity with the system. MDWCAs and WSDs are
subdivisions of the state government and in addition to increased financial regulation, they
have regulations governing the by-laws and management of their individual system. These
regulations include having 3 or 5 board members, conducting elections each November,
subjection to open meetings requirements, and requiring a quorum of water system members
or board members to make any decision about the water system. In addition to financial and
management regulations, they are still subjected to the requirements of the Safe Drinking
Water Act and any other NMED regulation.
To describe the excessive regulatory burden placed on MDWCAs, one manager said,
-

Probably the state would like us all to be mutual domestic, but some of my mutual
domestic friends say, “You don't want to become a mutual domestic. Too much
paperwork, too much regulatory compliance before you can do anything.” Like
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the contractor we worked with, he said he did some work for the mutual domestic
in [another town]. And he said, “We can't do anything until everybody's signed
off on five different levels.”

Personnel
Whereas water systems in larger towns and municipalities have paid water system managers,
all the board members of MDWCAs and WSDs are volunteer. They are required to have a
certified operator, who is generally paid, and most systems have an accountant who might be
paid, but they are not allowed to pay the board members, who are the people with the
responsibility of keeping up on regulation. Most board member presidents also run the water
system on a day-to-day basis. They are responsible for applying for grants and loans if their
systems need funding for things like deteriorating infrastructure. These individuals are
putting in an incredible amount of effort for being volunteers. Many of the interviewees
describe it as a part time job. On top of the effort and time spent, they also bear the
responsibility of providing safe water to their community and if there is ever a problem with
the water, such as water not reaching houses due to a water main break, they are the ones
who take the heat from upset residents and have to orchestrate the repairs. Some
communities have issues with people failing to pay their water bill on time and then a board
member must threaten to or actually turn off water to someone’s house. This can be
contentious in a small community and can alienate people and create enemies. With all of
these responsibilities, it is not surprising to see that small communities are struggling to keep
people engaged in running their drinking water systems.
Cooperatives are also managed by a volunteer board, but they tend to serve a different
demographic population than MDWCAs, so they tend to have people with different skillsets
on their boards. Cooperatives serve wealthier communities than MDWCAs and tend to have
people on their board who have backgrounds in professions like engineering, accounting, and
law. Because of this these backgrounds, they are able to do more of the “professional” work
themselves and it is likely that they have better access to professional resources based on
their knowledge and connections. To be clear, these backgrounds and skills do not mean that
they are better at the day-to-day operations of running water systems, they are just better
resourced and connected to meet requirements and regulations put in place by the state and
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federal governments. Paying to hire engineers, lawyers, and other water professionals is a
large expense for almost all the water systems we interviewed, but this expense is greater for
poorer communities because they are less likely to have those people in their communities
and on their board already.
During an interview, one manager described the increased bureaucracy and the
“professionalization” of people who run water systems by saying,
-

You have a lot of people that have been doing it for years and years. And if they
can't get certified or if they can't actually manage the system, the paperwork part
of it. They could probably do the actual footwork of it, and maintaining the actual
waterlines, but it's the paperwork that probably gets people. That's my feeling.”

Another manager discussed the type of person they think can successfully navigate the
bureaucracy by saying,
-

It takes a thinking person to really manage these nonprofits, these mutual
domestics. It really does. There's a lot of things that don't make sense. As you
start going and you start learning more and more about mutual domestics, it's
always a contradiction, sometimes.

These quotes speak to the constructed challenges that are created by governing institutions
that do not inherently come with managing a water system. These constructed challenges
contribute to making the people who are running systems no longer wanting to or able to run
them and makes it less likely that new people will want to or would be able to manage
systems.

Power Dynamics
A majority of drinking water system managers interviewed saw regulation in a similar way.
They understood the need for and supported financial and water quality regulations, but they
complained that they were not organized or enforced in a way that made them easy to comply
with. As discussed earlier, different institutional structures are regulated in different ways
and have different resources available to them. Not only is there the issue that the
institutional structures can have either negative or positive effects on different communities,
it is also problematic that the institutional structures are not as straight forward as they seem.
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The official institutional structure of a water system is listed on its Article of Incorporation
that is housed at the water system itself and it is also listed on the Secretary of State’s
website, but occasionally the institutional structures listed are not the same. Furthermore, the
managers of water systems may have a different idea of what institutional structure they are
or think they are an institutional structure that doesn’t technically exist. These findings were
all revealed in our interviews and looking up water systems in the business directory on the
Secretary of State’s webpage (portal.sos.state.nm.us/BFS/online/). Because of this
confusion, it appears that there is not necessarily this relationship of more regulation and
oversight means more money and resources. This can be particularly problematic to
MDWCAs because they have the highest level of regulation and oversight for their size.
Some systems might be complying with all the regulation, but not realizing that with that
regulation they are eligible to receive more money and resources.
This opaqueness of institutional structures is just one factor that contributes to a power
dynamic between the state and individual water systems. The state government is a much
more powerful force than small drinking water systems so the listing of the state is assumed
to be correct. The governance of drinking water systems is a top down approach. The state
controls water quantity through the OSE, water quality through NMED, and financial
regulations through multiple agencies. However, the state has very little enforcement power.
Drinking water systems can be given violations for many different issues, but from talking to
the managers of the systems, the main way these violations effect water systems is by making
it more challenging to receive state funding, with the exceptions of them being serious acute
violations of water quality or running out of water entirely. Most managers interviewed
complained that most of their violations were due to paperwork errors of being late on
regular water quality tests. By financially punishing water systems for being in violation, it
can be argued that the state is punishing communities who are most in need of assistance.
However, there are so many funding mechanisms that water systems may have many other
options, but a problem lies in that many managers do not know all the sources of funding.
Funding streams are listed various places online and NGOs, such as New Mexico Rural
Water Association and RCAC, have circuit riders that assist rural water systems, but many
managers do not have access to or are not knowledgeable in computers and the internet and
NGOs have limited capacity helping water systems find sources of funding.
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Because of its history, New Mexico is a very interesting place to study water issues. In his
book, Eric Perramond (2019) discusses how the water adjudication process of allocating
water rights based on first use, has had negative effects on many communities across New
Mexico, particularly communities who have long histories. The institutional mechanism of
adjudication was supposedly fair and based on time, but it affected communities in arguably
unfair ways. The institutional structures of water systems and the regulatory burden placed
on them can be looked at in a similar right. Communities have provided drinking water for
centuries, although many times it was non-sanitary, and increasingly through time, the
government has had increasing presence in rural communities through drinking water
regulation (Clark 1987). The regulations in themselves are not problematic, as everyone
wants safe and clean water, but along with that enforcement comes increased government
control and decreased community sovereignty. The fact that managers of most water systems
are volunteer further problematizes this power structure. Managers and other board members
are volunteer and are generally working other full-time jobs or are retired. As all the
interviewed managers stated, running a water system is a huge amount of work. Not
allowing managers to be paid means that many of them cannot afford to put in the time and
effort required to run the system and keep up with regulation and paperwork. Although,
paying them could create other problems and it would be an added expense for a small water
system. Requiring board members to volunteer selects for older retired people to run the
systems and because it is so much effort, other people rarely want to take over. Many times,
the management of a rural water system falls on one person who many times say they are
only doing it because no one else would.
The significant effort spent on regulations and paperwork combined with deteriorating
infrastructure, difficult to get funding, and lack of engaged residents makes it so many
systems are starting to somewhat fail. Out of the systems we visited and interviewed the
managers of, some of them were in great shape, but many could be described as close to
failing. Some of the main reason for this are old pipes that were leaking water almost as fast
as the well could pump, lack of a certified operator nearby, failure to obtain funding for new
infrastructure, manager burnout, confusing and overly burdensome regulation, and the fact
that many board member and operators are quite elderly. These issues are not necessarily
caused by the state government or regulations, but they have the potential to be exacerbated
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by the institutional structure of a water system. Because the institutional structures treat
systems differently, some water systems and communities are better equipped to deal with
these issues. Similar to what Perramond (2019) describes in his book, water governance
institutions that are meant to be neutral or help communities can actually harm some
communities in unjust and unequal ways.
Perhaps the most significant way that drinking water governance institutions are affecting
communities in unjust and unequal ways is with MDWCAs in lower income communities
and communities of color, specifically communities with a higher percent of Hispanic
residents. MDWCAs were originally created to improve drinking water in rural and lowincome communities (Clark 1987). Figure 5 shows that MDWCAs do serve communities of
lower income that other institutional structures. However, I argue that the institution of
MDWCAs are not meeting their goal in helping poorer communities because as Figures 7
and 8 show, the water rates are not lower than other institutional structures, and furthermore,
those communities are paying a higher percent of their income to their water bill. More
troubling is the fact that communities with MDWCAs also have a higher percent of Hispanic
residents, as seen in Figure 6, which means that lower income and predominantly Hispanic
communities are subject to more regulation and oversight and are largely not seeing the
benefit. The institutional structure is not reducing water rates and our interviews show that
there is a lack of people willing to be involved in water systems, and the volunteer managers
that they do have are not able to keep up with regulations and failing infrastructure. This
becomes a social and environmental justice issue, as these are affecting low-income and
predominantly Hispanic communities more than other communities.
When there is so much time and effort spent on day-to-day operations, satisfying regulations,
and looking for infrastructure funding, it is easy to forget the ecological part of the socialecological system that drinking water systems are. Communities face a plethora of
environmental threats such as contamination, wildfire, drought, and flood. Originally, I
anticipated our interviews with managers of rural water systems would largely focus on these
issues and what they were doing to manage them. Managers are so preoccupied with other
aspects of running a water system that they are hardly thinking about these issues.
Environmental concerns are generally longer-term problems and managers are faced with so
many issues that they need to deal with now. However, the day a wildfire burns a source
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watershed, a well runs dry, or a septic tank contaminates a well, they are no longer future
problems. The high demand from water system managers and the lack of resources makes it
so communities are largely not able to be proactive on many things including environmental
and source water concerns.

Meta-Analysis
The limitations of the interview data should be noted. As stated earlier, water systems were
randomized, and our research team went down the list emailing and calling the administrative
contact. In order to schedule 30 interviews, about one third of the 570 community drinking
water systems were contacted. Because most water system managers did not answer our
calls and email, call us back, or declined to be interviewed, we must think about who were
the individuals that agreed to be interviewed. We do not know differences in characteristics
of managers and water systems who decided to be interviewed and those who declined, but it
is my assumption that those who agreed to the interviews were from water systems that were
likely not in bad standing with the state government because we were researchers from a
state-run university and were coming to ask them questions about their water system.
Interviewees were assumed to see the need for the research because they took time out of
their day to participate. It was apparent that interviewees were trying to find solutions to
their problems and saw us as potentially helping. Because they were willing to participate, it
was assumed that they were the managers that were engaged in putting effort into their water
systems and were passionate about it. Because of all these reasons, it is my assumption that
as a whole, the water systems managed by our interviewees were likely to be better ran than
the state average. We did visit water systems that were struggling, but in those scenarios the
managers were new, or they were doing everything they could with their resources. We also
visited many systems that were run very well and had very few problems.
One interesting issue we ran into when asking managers about their institutional structure
compared to others and if they liked the institutional structure that they had; managers were
largely only knowledgeable in their institutional structure. When they were asked if they
were happy with the institutional structure of their water systems, most of them said they
were, but they had nothing to compare it to. So even though I am arguing that some
institutional structures are problematic, particularly MDWCAs, most managers of MDWCAs
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said there were happy with their institutional structure. What they were not happy with was
the amount of scattered regulation, some of which happened to be specific to their
institutional structure.

Solutions and Regionalization
Although I am critical of the state government and how they are managing drinking water
systems, government officials are aware of the issues that water systems are facing. The
problems stem from failing and outdated institutions, not the failure of individuals or even
specific government agencies. Government agencies and NGOs provide many trainings and
workshops all across the state to try to educate managers and operators on a variety of
different topics. The NMED goes to individual water systems and conducts sanitary surveys
and tells system managers what they need to do to ensure delivery of safe water and be in
compliance. NGOs, such as New Mexico Rural Water Association (NMRWA), RCAC, and
the Southwest Environmental Finance Center, help systems with budgets, securing grants and
loans, as well as provide trainings and workshops.
One solution that many governing institutions see as a way to help rural drinking water
systems is the creation of regional water systems or creating regional management offices
that oversee multiple water systems. It is impossible to research drinking water institutions
in New Mexico and not be bombarded with information and stances on regionalization. The
state government is generally promoting regionalization, RCAC is strongly in favor of
regionalization, and NMRWA views regionalization more as a tool that could help some
water systems. The topic of regionalization often came up unprompted in our interviews and
managers generally had a strong opinion either for or against it.
New Mexico State Government
While researching the institutions of New Mexico state government, I could not find a stated
position on regionalization, but I did come across many telling clues as to what their position
is. The 2000 amendment to the Sanitary Projects Act made it more difficult to create a new
MDWCA. To make a new one, a community must not be adjacent or sufficiently close to a
municipality or other existing water system. They must prove that consolidation to a nearby
system is not possible. Because of this, very few new MDWCAs have been created.
According to one interviewee, even with a team of lawyers, engineers, and hydrologists, it

66

was very difficult to create a new MDWCA, because they were already reasonably close to
an existing water system.
Funding mechanisms also give a clue to how the state government of New Mexico views
numerous small drinking water systems. A funding mechanism that came up in many of our
interviews was the State Revolving Loan Fund that was created by the 1996 amendment to
the federal Clean Water Act. Most of the money is federal, but the state does pitch in some
money and dictates the terms of loans and who receives them. In New Mexico it is
administered by the New Mexico Finance Authority. Below is the description of how New
Mexico allocates its loan funds (State of New Mexico. Drinking Water State Revolving Fund
State Fiscal Year 2020 Intended Use Plan):
-

To become eligible for a DWSRLF loan, a System submits a project interest form
(PIF) to the DWB [Drinking Water Bureau], and must have managerial, financial
and technical capacity in order to be put on the Fundable List. The DWB
maintains a multi-year Comprehensive List which ranks each project using
specific criteria and ensures that the projects with the greatest need will be offered
DWSRLF assistance first.

A few things stand out in this brief statement. First, water systems must already have
adequate personnel to be eligible for funds. This can be a major hurdle for MDWCAs and
WSDs because they rely on community volunteers to run their systems. This makes it so
systems most in need may not have adequate personnel and therefore are not eligible for this
significant funding stream, although many other loan and grant options exist. More telling
about the state’s goal for small water systems is the criteria for ranking systems. Systems
receive extra priority points if they are trying to consolidate in some way. More points are
given to physically connecting systems and a few points are given for plans to share
resources (State of New Mexico. Drinking Water State Revolving Fund State Fiscal Year
2020 Intended Use Plan). Because of this, the state is actively promoting regionalization.
The state also gives more points to systems that are currently in compliance with state and
federal regulation. This funding is not based on time or waiting in line; it is solely based on
priority points. This incentivizes systems to try to get as many points as possible, so they are
more likely to get funding.
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Why does the New Mexico state government want to regionalize water systems? I could not
find a specific reason why on any document or on their webpages, but one reason is assumed
to be “capacity development” which was promoted in the 1996 amendment to the Safe
Drinking Water Act. The EPA defines it as, “Capacity Development is a process for water
systems to acquire and maintain adequate technical, managerial and financial (TMF)
capacity. TMF capacity enables water systems to have the capability to consistently provide
safe drinking water to the public” (EPA. Building the Capacity of Drinking Water Systems).
They contend that smaller water systems generally have lower TMF capacity, so therefor it is
better to consolidate systems to increase capacity. This is similar to the concept of
economies of scale. Particularly with water quality regulation, governments want all
communities to have the same standard, or else there is an environmental justice issue.
Larger communities may have the ability to comply with these regulations, but smaller
communities may not. To solve this problem, governing institutions are trying to increase
the TMF capacity of small water systems, in an effort to make them more like larger
municipal water systems and able to more easily comply with regulations.
Another reason that could not be found in any government document or webpage, but was
brought up by many of the managers we interviewed, is that for the state, it is easier to
regulate and support fewer number of systems. Many interviewed managers complained that
the state gives money in larger chunks to larger water systems because it means less
paperwork and less oversight for them. This may or may not be true, but many managers of
small systems thought this was the case and were bitter about it. It is no secret that the
NMED has had chronically high employee turnover rates. It makes sense that the state
would want to decrease the quantity and “professionalize” water systems in order to make it
easier on their end to regulate them and provide assistance.
Rural Community Assistance Cooperation
A major player in rural drinking water systems, as well as communities in general, is Rural
Community Assistance Cooperation (RCAC). They are a 501(c)(3) non-profit and are the
Western US affiliate of the Rural Community Assistance Partnership (RCAP). They provide
loans and various forms of technical assistance and trainings to drinking water systems and
communities. Loan interest rates for drinking water systems are variable, but they state that
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long term loans are generally around 5% and there is a 1% loan fee (RCAC 2019.
Environmental Infrastructure Loan Program). There is no information on conditionally of
their loans, but their Strategic Plan gives some insight to their motivations. The top two
listings on their “Strategic Direction” in their “Strategic Plan” are “Form regional
collaborations to achieve economies of scale and take advantage of new opportunities” and
“Ensure communities, and especially schools, have access to and increase consumption of
safe drinking water” (RCAC 2015–2019 Strategic Plan). The focus on economies of scale
and increased consumption make it appear that RCAC’s assumptions about water systems are
based on a neo-classical economic model. RCAC receives the majority of their funding from
federal and state grants, including from the New Mexico Environment Department (Rural
Community Assistance Corporation 2019). These sources accounted for 69 percent of total
revenue in 2019. They also receive a significant portion of their revenue from corporate
donations and interest from their loan program. Because they lend to less traditional
borrowers, their loans are mostly backed up and guaranteed by federal agencies. RCAC also
holds significant investments in land, certificates of deposit, and corporations.
RCAC’s website paints a specific picture of what rural means to them. There is an
interesting quote on the advocacy section of RCAC’s website that states:
-

Sub-standard housing and poverty are commonplace in low-income rural
communities. Many of these communities also face daunting challenges to access
safe, clean drinking water and to develop other vital infrastructure. These issues
are often overlooked in policy because rural communities lack the resources,
training or social networks that are found in urban areas. Learn how you can
advocate for the under-served population in the West. (rcac.org)

This sentiment implies that rural communities are not connected and need to be advocated for
by outside groups. From my experience interviewing managers of rural drinking water
systems in New Mexico, they generally have strong social networks and are well connected.
Often times they appear to be great advocates for themselves.
New Mexico Rural Water Association (NMRWA)
Another prominent drinking water related NGO is New Mexico Rural Water Association
(NMRWA). They are the New Mexico affiliate of the National Rural Water Association
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(NRWA). The mission of the agency is to, “provide the highest quality training and
technical assistance to rural water and wastewater utilities throughout New Mexico, and to
represent the legislative and regulatory interests of our members” (NMRWA. About Us).
Drinking water systems pay dues to be a member and receive numerous benefits. NMRWA
does not directly provide funding, but they do help water systems receive funding from other
sources.
Like RCAC, NMRWA receives a majority of its funding through federal and state grants; 68
percent in 2011 (New Mexico Rural Water Association 2012). However, they do not
generate revenue through loan interest, and they do not receive significant corporate
donations. They receive most of their other revenue from fees to attend their annual
conference and annual membership fees for water systems and water related vendors and
service companies. There is a significant difference between NMRWA and RCAC in that
water systems are due paying members of NMRWA and they only focus on rural drinking
water in New Mexico. RCAC does not have members, they operate throughout the Western
US, and they are involved in issues other than water.
NMRWA seems to be having somewhat of a turf war with RCAC. This is apparent from
interviews with multiple parties and even apparent in NMRWA’s vision statement of, “Our
vision is to be recognized as the principal advocate and authoritative source of information
and technical reference in respect to rural water needs and management” (NMRWA. About
Us). Part of this rivalry is because they offer similar programs, including trainings and
technical support, but it also seems to be because of their different stance on regionalization,
and thus different political and economic assumptions. NMRWA is not universally
supportive of regionalization. They describe it as a tool that can help some communities
based on their particular situation.
Although a few interviewees had a negative perception of NMRWA because they viewed the
annual membership fee as one more obligation and expense, most interviewees had a positive
perception of NMRWA. This contrasts with RCAC. Many interviewees expressed positive
sentiment for RCAC, but others had negative perceptions of them because of their position
on regionalization and the fear that they wanted to take control away from the local
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managers. Additionally, multiple managers accused RCAC of promoting regionalization in
order to financially benefit an affiliated engineering firm.
NRWA released a statement on their position on sustainability in 2018 (NRWA 2018
Statement on Water Utility Sustainability). In this statement they call out other agencies for
their blanket promotion of regionalization and argue that it can be a tool but should be left up
to local communities. Additionally, they argue that “If communities are coerced to
consolidate; one can almost guarantee future controversy.” NRWA came out with another
statement on sustainability titled NRWA Statement on Small Water Systems – False Narrative
(2018). In this statement they claim that other entities are promoting the idea that small
systems are not sustainable as a way to financially benefit themselves or, if coming from a
state agency, as a way to reduce their regulatory burden.
Regionalization findings from interviews
How do the positions of these agencies compare to the perspectives of the people managing
the rural drinking water systems in New Mexico? As previously stated, most managers of
rural water systems had strong opinions on regionalization. The manager interviews
consisted of managers from water systems ranging from formally regionalized, informally
regionalized, and very independent. Some communities had gone through formal
regionalization plans and were part of a larger system or were underneath an umbrella that
handled logistics. Other managers were open to regionalization, which was generally the
case when they were overwhelmed with numerous and time-consuming obligations. They
would be happy for someone to come in and take it over. However, all systems did have
some reservations in that it was important for their communities that water was controlled
locally by someone in their community. Numerous other communities were adamantly
against regionalization. Reasons include loss of water rights, sovereignty, exploitation, trust,
finances, and practicality. Along with many states in the west, water rights are a contentious
issue in New Mexico and have a long history behind them (Perramond 2019). Drinking
water systems are assigned a certain number of acre-feet of water, which is defined as the
quantity of water needed to irrigate one acre with 12 inches of water each year. Many
systems are concerned that by regionalizing they are going to effectively be giving some of
their water right to another community. Systems also are worried that by formally joining
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with another system, they will be saddled with that other system’s financial responsibilities
or loan burdens. It appears that many times when regionalization is proposed, one system is
in a better position with finances or infrastructure and if they join with that system, they are
then going to also be responsible for that system. One system may be a winner in the deal
and another could be a loser. Practicality also came up during interviews. Many rural
systems are not close to other water systems and because of this, consolidating into one entity
does not make practical sense.
As described above, regionalization may not be ideal for logistical reasons, but much more
importantly, people are hesitant to regionalization because of what it represents: loss of
control and sovereignty. In New Mexico, some people have a religious or spiritual
connection to water and water forms community bonds. Many rural communities are very
old and often the same families have lived there for generations. The people who manage
water systems are generally individuals who have strong connections to the community.
They view pushes to regionalization as negative for many reasons, and sometimes personally
insulting.
Meeting state regulations is a major hurdle for rural communities. Although many see these
regulations as important and in their best interest, the reporting and logistical burdens can be
overwhelming. Because of this, many see regulation as a loss of community control for their
system, especially when they are in violation and the state has to intervene. Communities
want safe drinking water, but in many places, people have been drinking that water for
generations. It is frustrating for them that government agencies are now telling them that
their water is not good enough and they must spend money to treat it. It is easy to see now
this can lead to resentment for government and regulating agencies. One manager even
believed that the regulations were over-burdensome on purpose. They cause water systems
to be in violation, so the state could come in and take control. Others don’t go quite this far
in claiming this exactly, but the sentiment was similar for many systems.
Urbanization is an issue as some young people leave for the cities, but it appears that
especially in areas that have scenic landscapes, older and retired people are moving in. In
some places where this is the case, people are worried about enough water rights to
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accommodate the increased use. As far as this topic goes, every community is different, and
one narrative does not apply for all rural communities in New Mexico.
Water experts also talk about how there is a lack of expertise in rural communities. This is
true if water experts are considered people who are engineers, hydrologists, lawyers and the
like. The “professionalization” of water likely came along with the adjudication process of
the state trying to quantify water use and then again with the Safe Drinking Water Act
(Perramond 2019). People must be properly trained and have certifications, which makes it
so the person who may have operated a water system for years, is no longer certified to do it.
This increases cost for water systems because they must hire outside operators, engineers,
lawyers, and accountants.
Loss of sovereignty and control is perhaps the biggest reason that water systems are hesitant
to regionalization. Many small communities that have their own water systems have been
there for hundreds of years. These are often communities with a high percentage of Native
American and Hispanic populations. They have long been marginalized and have had their
resources and land taken from them. Communities are rightly hesitant to let the state or other
outsiders come in and take more control of a natural resource. Many believe there are
ulterior motives and would agree with the statement from NRWA that there is a falsenarrative about small water systems being unsustainable and that regionalization is often
promoted for financial interests.
One last reason that communities are hesitant to regionalization is that most are somewhat
regionalized already. Contrary to the statement by RCAC that rural areas lack social
networks, my research has found that rural water system managers are part of a tight-knit
network of individuals and they seem to be well connected to politicians and state officials.
Their systems may not be physically connected, but they rely on each other for expertise,
sharing resources and parts, and physically helping each other fix issues, such as water main
breaks. They do not see a need to create a formal agreement on consolidating their resources.
If they want to cooperate with their neighbor, they are likely to do it organically. One
interviewee who was very opposed to regionalization was already highly informally
regionalized with neighboring communities. It appeared that they ran a handful of systems
almost as one. Because they were technically each one system, there were also a handful of
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people involved in running them. If they were regionalized into one system, this could make
it so fewer people are running those existing water systems and could reduce the system’s
TMF capacity. People in these communities have been operating drinking water systems for
sometimes hundreds of years. They do not see why just now it has become unsustainable for
them to keep running their own independent system.
Neighboring systems collaborating with each other to run their drinking water systems is an
example of collective-action where people from different communities work together to
ensure reliable drinking water for their communities. Challenges, such as water main breaks,
require a significant amount of resources to fix, and many small towns rely on neighbors for
their labor and parts to quickly get their systems running again. Most systems say they do
not rely on neighboring systems, but they clearly are in close contact with each other and are
quick to help when a neighboring manager needs help or resources. Out of the ten reasons
identified that effect likelihood of self-organization (Ostrom 2009), the three identified to
have played the biggest role in this scenario are the size of resource system,
leadership/entrepreneurship, and importance of resource. Most of these water systems are
very small and only have a few people involved in their operation, so they are likely to need
assistance when they have a large issue. Because there are so few people running the
systems with limited resources, they have to be resourceful, dedicated to their community,
and be strong leaders. Drinking water is obviously an incredibly important resource, so
communities will find a way to get it at any cost, so therefore they are likely to use all the
resources they have, including coordinating and collaborating with neighboring water
systems.

Application of theory
Community drinking water systems in New Mexico are part of a complex social-ecological
system that rely on an ecosystem service to provide a requirement for human life. How this
social-ecological system is managed can have a large impact on the ability of individuals and
communities to meet their goals. As described, drinking water governance is very much a
top-down system, where the state government has strict control on the quality and quantity of
water. There is a need for some sort of top down governance, or preferably a polycentric
governance scheme, which does exist because there are many layers of decision-making
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power. However, decision making power is skewed towards the state government, especially
for MDWCAs which comprise of small, low-income, and historically underserved
communities. These communities are given little decision-making power themselves and
have the least amount resources to comply with the top-down decisions placed upon them.
There is a need for some sort of statewide institution to enforce regulations of water quantity,
water quality, and financial resources because out of the eight requirements Ostrom (1990)
lays out for successful collective governance, many are lacking when it comes to governance
of drinking water.
First, source water does not have clearly defined boundaries. The control on water quantity
is a peculiar institution because its history and origin do not necessarily translate well into
today’s current water situation. The current system of top-down management does not seem
to be successful for many small drinking water systems, partially because some communities
have excessive water rights whereas others do not have enough, but mostly because the
system of allocating water rights does not translate to the amount of water actually available.
Many drinking water systems have plenty of physical water available, but they lack the rights
to it, whereas other systems have plenty of water rights, but do not have enough physical
water. The state is getting a better idea of water availability, particularly groundwater
resources, but there still seems to be a lack of knowledge.
Another one of the eight rules that is currently lacking is the enforcement of rules and
graduated sanctions. NMED and the OSE do not have much power to enforce their
regulations. According to water system managers, their main enforcement mechanism is
making it more difficult for systems to receive state funds. There are more regulations for
MDWCAs than other water systems their size and they are generally in communities with
lower income and are predominantly Hispanic. For reasons previously discussed, they have
more challenges in satisfying the regulations, and because they are lower income
communities, the punishment of making access to funds more difficult has a larger negative
effect on them than Cooperatives that generally serve higher income communities.
Perhaps the rule that is currently the most lacking is participatory decision-making. The
board members of MDWCAs have relatively little say in how they manage their water
system. MDWCAs are technically subdivisions of the state government, so the state holds
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almost all the decision-making power. Managers expressed frustration in their lack of
control over their system and the lack of resources given to them by the state. Many
interviewees point out that the state is very willing to come and tell systems what they are
doing wrong, but do not tell them what to do to fix issues. The role of the state government
is to regulate, not necessarily to give assistance, but the state is the entity that water systems
interact with regularly, so they are who people look to for assistance.
Robustness of a social-ecological system is defined as “the maintenance of some desired
system characteristics despite fluctuations in the behavior of its component parts or its
environment” (Carlson and Doyle 2002). My analysis shows that as a whole, drinking water
systems in New Mexico are not very robust. As described earlier, water system managers
face a plethora of challenges related to infrastructure, human capital, lack of resources,
burdensome and complicated regulations, and environmental threats. If any of these continue
to deteriorate or fail completely, water systems will likely not be able to continue to meet the
“desired system characteristic” of providing safe and reliable drinking water to their residents
and satisfy state regulatory requirements.
The institutional structure of MDWCA seems to be one of the more problematic aspects of
drinking water governance in New Mexico and the theory of institutional work can do a lot to
explain this. As Clark (1987) describes, MDWCAs were originally created in 1947 with the
intent of giving state resources to rural low-income communities to improve or create
drinking water systems in an effort to improve rural health. He describes this scheme as
largely being successful. The Sanitary Projects Acts have updated the institutional structure,
but the overall structure seems to have remained quite similar. Every time a new MDWCA
was created, regulations were enforced, and state funding was dispersed, the structure of
MDWCA was further strengthened as an institution. A main idea of institutional work is that
no action taking place involving an institution is benign to that institution; it is either
creating, maintaining, or disrupting that institution. For example, enforcing regulations upon
MDWCAs maintains the institution and creates a sort of institutional momentum. The
passage of new environmental or financial regulation may not specifically change the legal
institutional structure of MDWCA in the Sanitary Projects Act, but new burden is placed
upon them and does in fact alter MDWCA as an institution. This has happened so many
times throughout the more than 70-year history of MDWCAs that even though the statutory
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structure has remained fairly constant, the institution of MDWCA and what it encompasses,
has been drastically changed. The concept of institutional work is useful in this scenario
because even though legislation may not change MDWCAs specifically, it relates to
MDWCAs and therefore must have some sort of effect on it.
In this situation, formal changes to related institutions have had a negative impact on
MDWCAs, specifically through the creation of regulations. Because the creation of
regulations did not coincide with more resources for MDWCAs, these tangential changes
have shifted the power balance away from MDWCAs and the communities they serve and
towards the state government. Regulation of drinking water is one of the main ways that
many communities interact with the state government and this power shift in water
governance has altered state politics as a whole. On top of this, it has had the strongest
negative effects on small, low income, and predominantly Hispanic communities.
In addition to the change in power dynamics, these institutional changes have made water
systems in these communities more vulnerable. In theory, stricter water quality regulations
should benefit the people who live in that community. If water systems have the resources
and knowledge to keep up on regulation and navigate the bureaucracy this could be the case.
However, this is not the case for most small rural systems. Instead of being proactive and
thinking about issues such as aging infrastructure and environmental concerns, managers are
stuck wading through a confusing bureaucracy.
Another reason why the theory of institutional work is useful in this situation is because it
does not appear than anyone was explicitly trying to shift the power dynamic away from
rural communities. Purposive institutional creation, through passage of regulation
legislation, performed work on the tangential institution of MDWCA. Politicians likely
passed these regulations because they thought they would benefit communities. The
regulations themselves would likely be beneficial, but they have been enacted in a way that
has been net negative for small and rural communities.
I argue that MDWCA is an overall negative institution, but it is also a strong institution.
Throughout its more than 70-year history, many water systems have joined the institution.
Each time a system is added, it acts as reinforcing institutional work and makes the
institution stronger. Reinforcing institutional work happens every time regulations are
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enforced, a compliance officer is hired by the state, or when a training session is held for
MDWCA managers. Even though some of these actions can be considered positive, they still
can reinforce the institution of MDWCA and therefore reinforce the power structures that
have been created throughout the years through various forms of institutional work. Because
the institution of MDWCA is so strong, it would take a substantial amount of disrupting
institutional work to significantly alter it. It is very difficult for water systems to legally
change institutional structures, which was one of the main findings in the report Water and
Wastewater Systems of New Mexico (Flynn-O’Brian & O’Leary 2005). Also, there are no
good alternatives if communities still want to be eligible for state funding. Because of this, it
could be better to alter the structure of MDWCA itself in a way that would make it more
equitable and help reduce the vulnerability of rural drinking water systems in New Mexico.

Chapter 2 Conclusion
Community drinking water systems in New Mexico are facing numerous challenges. The
people who manage these systems are faced with the physical challenges of day-to-day
operations, maintaining aging infrastructure, and addressing serious environmental concerns.
Our interviews with managers of rural water systems revealed that they are also faced with
the challenges of keeping on top of a confusing and overly burdensome regulatory structure.
The communities that this is negatively affecting the most are communities with MDWCAs,
which are typically small, low income, and predominantly Hispanic. MDWCAs are
subdivisions of the state government and are eligible for much more funding options than
other institutional structures. However, MDWCAs have among the highest water rates, so it
does not appear that having more grants and loans available to them is making water any
more affordable. The trade-off of increased regulation for increased funding options does not
seem to be paying off for MDWCAs as a whole.
Rural communities across the state are struggling in having enough people manage and
operate their water systems. For most institutional structures, managers are not paid, but are
tasked with a huge amount of work and responsibility. In addition to the responsibility of
providing safe drinking water to their community, they are responsible for keeping on top of
many different regulations. Not having enough experienced people has decreased their
technical, managerial and financial capacity. The state government and RCAC are trying to
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promote regionalization as a way to build this capacity, so their capacity is more on par with
larger municipal water systems. Although regionalization could help in some limited
situations, this solution is unlikely to solve the core issues, and can have negative
implications in community sovereignty and identity.
Institutional work is a useful theoretical lens to analyze this situation. Institutional work is
purposeful action that creates, maintains, or disrupts institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby
2006). Although the institution of MDWCA has not experienced significant legal change,
tangential institutional changes have made MDWCA a very different institution than when it
began. Because of these changes, it is no longer serving its intended function of helping lowincome rural communities.
Throughout the years, actions such as increasing the number of MDWCA water systems, the
increased number of regulations and sources of funding for MDWCAs, and an increase in
personnel whose employment is then attached to the continuation of MDWCAs, can all be
considered reinforcing institutional work that had made is so the institution of MDWCA is
strong to this day. However, the institution of MDWCA appears to be creating more
negative than positive outcomes. Most affected by these negative outcomes are communities
that are rural, low-income, and predominantly Hispanic. The institutional structure of
MDWCA may have started out positive and helped communities who were most in need, but
through its more than 70-year history, is has become negative and racially discriminatory.
MDWCAs likely always encompassed communities with a higher percentage of Hispanic
residents, but it becomes racially discriminatory when it shifts from being something that
helps underserved communities to something that is harming them.
This institutional change has shifted the power dynamic of drinking water governance in
New Mexico. Power has shifted from communities to state governing agencies. Instead of
state agencies serving for the existence and success of drinking water systems, the situation
has flipped so that drinking water systems appear to be serving for the existence of state
agencies. This dynamic does not promote long-term delivery of clean and safe drinking
water to rural communities.
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Conclusion
In the two chapters of this paper, I have argued that drinking water governance in New
Mexico no longer appears to be for the water system; instead it appears that water systems
are serving for the existence of state governing institutions. Chapter 1 shows this by
explaining how overly burdensome and confusing regulations are adding to the needs and
concerns of drinking water system managers and making the systems more vulnerable. It is
also contributing to their challenge of not having enough people to manage their system
because it requires a lot of effort and responsibility for no pay and little reward. Because
water system managers are spending so much time on “today problems,” such as keeping up
on regulations, they are not thinking about and planning for longer term issues such as aging
infrastructure and environmental concerns. With potential increasing climate uncertainty due
to climate change, this is especially concerning. Because many water systems are lacking
experienced personnel, they have a low capacity to adapt to environmental perturbations,
which further increases their vulnerability. There is the general idea that rural water systems
in New Mexico are starting to fail, and although this is somewhat true, water is important
enough and communities are dedicated enough that they will likely continue to provide water
to their community. Whether or not it is complaint with all regulations is another question.
Chapter 2 takes a closer look at institutional dynamics, including both governing institutions
and the institutional structures of drinking water systems themselves. By using the
theoretical lens of institutional work, I argue that although the legal institutional structure of
MDWCA has remained relatively consistent, the institution of MDWCA has shifted greatly,
particularly through tangential legislation of increased regulatory demand and oversight.
Additionally, the institution of MDWCA remains strong because of all the reinforcing
institutional work acted upon it through actions like increasing the number MDWCA water
systems, hiring regulatory staff, and putting on trainings for MDWCA managers. To
significantly alter the institution of MDWCA it would take a significant amount of altering
institutional work.
Through this paper, I hope to create some amount of altering institutional work for the
institution of MDWCA and for drinking water governance in general. I identify many flaws
in how drinking water is governed in New Mexico, but it is likely much more difficult to
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significantly improve it. However, I will offer some recommendations. First, it would be
very beneficial for small water systems if they had less of a regulatory burden. Regulations
and standards should not be decreased, they should just be consolidated in some way or
government agencies should take more responsibility and a larger role. Second, water
systems should be allowed to pay their managers. This would likely create other problems,
but because one of their biggest issues is not having enough people to run their system, it
would likely help to improve that situation. Another benefit of this proposal is that it would
create employment. Employment opportunities are limited in rural communities, so even a
very part time water manager position could help. Ideally, all or a significant portion of the
money required to do this would come from the state government. Having paid managers
could pay for itself by decreasing the need for regulatory enforcement and by having people
more proactive on asset management and preemptively addressing environmental concerns.
Both of these suggestions are only ideas and would create winners and losers and most
certainly create other problems. However, rural community drinking water systems in New
Mexico are in a precarious position, and if action is not taken soon, the situation is likely to
continue to get worse.
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